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INTRODUCTION
We know remarkably little about frivolous litigation. Reliable
empirical data is extremely limited, and casual anecdotal evidence
highly unreliable. We have no clear explanation of why frivolous suits
are filed or even common agreement on what constitutes a "frivolous
suit."
Nevertheless, there is widespread belief that frivolous litigation is
out of control.' Many people cite frivolous suits as the cause of the
litigation system's most serious ills-huge case backlogs, long delays
and high trial costs.2 Americans are simply too litigious, the critics
See WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 247-70 (1991) (discussing examples of frivolous
litigation); INSURANCE INFO. INST., ATTITUDES TOWARD THE LIABILITY AND LITIGATION
SYSTEM 17 (1982) (Gallup survey reporting that 31% of the general public perceives
lawsuits asjustified "less than half of the time" and 41% perceives lawsuits as justified
.about half of the time"); Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors'Judgments of
Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. &
SoC'Y REV. 85, 96 (1992) (noting that research revealed "a widespread impression
among jurors that the civil litigation system is overburdened by claimants seeking
awards in meritless cases"); What America Really Thinks About Lawyers, NAT'L LJ., Aug.
18, 1986, at S-1, S-3, S-8 (reporting the results of a poll on how Americans feel about
lawyers and their role in the "litigation explosion" that has led to the so-called liability
and medical malpractice crises); see also Scott S. Partridge et al., A Complaint Based on
Rumors: Countering Fivolous Litigation, 31 LOY. L. REv. 221, 233-34 (1985) (recounting
popular anecdotes of frivolous litigation).
- See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVILJUSTICE
REFORM IN AMERICA 1-3, 8-9 (1991) (describing the high costs of unrestrained litiga-
tion); NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER
SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS (Mar. 20, 1990),
reprinted in 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3 (1990) (discussing New York's legislative efforts to
deal with frivolous litigation and proposing reforms); Warren E. Burger, The State of
Justice, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1984, at 62, 65 (commenting on the growing abuse of discovery);
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say, and all too fond of filing meritess suit.
3
Indeed, concern about frivolous litigation has inspired some of
the most significant procedural developments of the past two dec-
ades. During the 1980s, for example, federal courts tightened plead-
ing requirements in areas such as civil rights, antitrust and share-
holder derivative litigation in an effort to screen out frivolous suits.
4
In 1983, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules overhauled Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to strengthen sanctions for
frivolous filings.5 And in a trilogy of cases decided during the 1985
term, the Supreme Court broadened the availability of summary
judgment in part to weed out frivolous cases before trial.6
Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Frivolous Lawsuits-The Lauyer's Duty to Say "No," 52 U. COLO. L.
REV. 367, 367 (1981) ("[T]he 'sue the bastard' mentality has helped create the
'frivolous' lawsuit with all its undesirable baggage-undue harassment, both personal
and monetary, clogging of the judicial machinery, and mistrust of the legal system in
general and lawyers in particular."); Partridge et al., supra note 1, at 232-35 (describing
the adverse impact of frivolous litigation); John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A
Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433, 436 & n.8 (1986)
(arguing that frivolous litigation has greatly added to court clogging and public exas-
peration).
3 People often collapse what are in fact quite distinct complaints, one about exces-
sive litigation and the other about abusive litigation. For a critique of the claim that
America has become more litigious in recent decades, see Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983). For a discussion of
the Froblems in defining frivolous suits, see infra Part II.
See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 433, 447-51 (1986) (arguing that despite the Su-
preme Court's statements regarding notice pleading, in practice, federal courts insist
on detailed factual allegations in antitrust, civil rights and securities fraud cases). In
1993, the Supreme Court stopped this trend by holding that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure required a liberal pleading approach. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993) (rejecting the
Fifth Circuit's heightened pleading standard for civil rights cases). Still, some federal
courts continue to require specificity despite Leatherman. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14
F.3d 449, 455-57 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying heightened pleading requirement to a
Bivens action against an individual government agent); Storer Cable Communications,
Inc. v. City of Montgomery, 826 F. Supp. 1338, 1347 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (holding that
even with liberal pleading requirements, the plaintiff must still plead sufficient facts so
that each element of an alleged antitrust violation can be identified); Karen M. Blum,
Heightened Pleading: Is There Life After Leatherman?, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 75-87
(1994) (surveying post-Leatherman case law on heightened pleading requirements).
5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983) (referring to the goals of
discouraging dilatory or abusive tactics and lessening frivolous claims or defenses).
The Advisory Committee amended Rule 11 again in 1993 to soften its impact, but de-
terrence of frivolous litigation remains its chief purpose. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's note (1993).
6 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25, 327 (1986); Anderson v. Lib-
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More recently, during the 1994 campaign, Republican candidates
for Congress highlighted abusive litigation in their "Contract With
America."7 After the election, the Republican Congress entertained
several bills designed to deter frivolous suits.8 In December 1995, one
of those bills, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,9
became law over Presidential veto. Later, in April 1996, the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, '0 designed to deter frivolous prisoner
suits, also became law."
This combination of informational deficit and regulatory zeal is
fraught with obvious danger. We cannot make sound policy on the
basis of anecdote and conjecture. We need a much more reliable
basis for predicting costs and benefits. And for this, we need a posi-
tive theory of frivolous litigation. To be useful, however, such a
theory must answer an apparently simple, yet surprisingly difficult,
question: Why would anyone ever file a frivolous suit? If a suit lacks
merit and has very little chance of trial success, no rational person
would spend thousands of dollars to try the case. To be sure, a plain-
tiff might sue if he thought he could obtain an early settlement. But
this raises another, equally vexing question: Why would a defendant
ever settle if he knows the plaintiff would never litigate; why not sim-
ply call the plaintiff's bluff instead?
This Article constructs a positive theory of frivolous litigation ca-
pable of answering these questions, and then examines the policy
implications for regulating frivolous suits.' 2 Because reliable data is
erty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88, 597 (1986).
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWr GINGRICH, REP. DICK
ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 143-55 (Ed Gillespie &
Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (arguing that frivolous lawsuits make a mockery of the
American justice system and offering various "common sense legal reforms" to solve
the problem).
See, e.g., Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act, H.R. 956, 104th Cong.
(1996) (implementing measures, including punitive damage caps, for controlling
products liability cases); Attorney Accountability Act, H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995)
(adopting two-way conditional fee shifting and stricter Rule 11 sanctions); Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. (1995) (prescribing limits on
private actions for securities fraud).
9 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
10 Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996).
11 Moreover, congressional enthusiasm for reform has inspired similar efforts at
the state level. See, e.g., Doris S. Wong, Tort Reform Unveiled by Weld: Critics Contend Plan
Unfair to Consumers, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 1995, at 27 (reporting on a Massachusetts
bill similar to congressional tort reform legislation).
12 I focus on frivolous suits and ignore other kinds of frivolous litigation activity,
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scarce and obstacles to empirical work severe, I focus on a body of
work by law-and-economics scholars that uses game-theoretic models
to study the frivolous suit problem. I translate this work for a non-
technical audience and show how its insights can be useful in shaping
regulatory policy.
In addition, I present a new model that fills a gap in the litera-
ture. Most work to date focuses on so-called "strike suits"-cases in
which a plaintiff files knowing her suit is frivolous. No one has yet
developed a model that shows what happens when a plaintiff files suit
ignorant of the merits because she has not investigated.13 This is a
significant omission, since cases of this sort comprise much of what
people consider frivolous. Indeed, the most important innovation of
the 1983 version of Rule 11, carried forward in the 1993 revision,
4
requires parties to conduct a reasonable prefiling inquiry. 5 My new
model explains why plaintiffs might not investigate before filing even
when investigation is feasible, and this explanation provides a frame-
work for the later policy analysis.
At the most general level, this Article aims to bridge the wide gap
between lawyer-economists who use game-theoretic techniques to
model procedural rules, and mainstream proceduralists, lawyers and
judges who make, apply and critique those rules." Game theory is ex-
such as defenses, motions and discovery requests. There is evidence that frivolous
suits pose the most serious problem. See THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE RULE 11
SANCTIONING PROCESS 78 tbl.12 (1988) (reporting that over one-half of cases under
1983 Rule 11 involved the filing of an unjustified complaint); Lawrence C. Marshall et
al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 943, 953 (1992) (finding, in a sur-
vey of Rule 11 activity among lawyers, that "the most common reason for actual sanc-
tions, as well as for motions and show cause orders, is the filing of allegedly frivolous
suits or claims").
is Professor Nalebuff has developed a model in which an uninformed plaintiff files
suit and offers a settlement to an informed defendant. See Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pre-
trial Negotiation, 18 RANDJ. ECON. 198, 198-209 (1987). Because it does not include
investigation, however, Nalebuff's model cannot explain why plaintiffs choose to re-
main uninformed.
14 SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (1993).
15 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 & advisory committee's note (1983); see also Marshall et al.,
supra note 12, at 947-48 (noting that the 1983 and 1993 versions of Rule 11 instructed
judges to look into what an attorney should have known about the law and facts of a
case after conducting a reasonable prefiling inquiry).
16 Economists who do game-theoretic work in litigation tend to write for technical
audiences and publish mainly in specialized journals beyond the reach of most law-
yers,judges and legal academics interested in procedural reform. By the same token,
proceduralists tend to shun game-theoretic models partly because of their mathemati-
cal technicality, partly because of doubts about their utility, and partly because of a
mistaken impression that they conceal a conservative political agenda or a morally
1997]
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tremely useful to procedural analysis because it is the best, and per-
haps the only, systematic way to analyze strategic interaction essential
to predicting litigation behavior. 7 Fortunately, the basic insights of
game theory do not require technical sophistication, and this Article
avoids mathematical technicality by explaining the models with sim-
ple expository narratives that show how strategically motivated parties
might think through their choices and decide what to do. The
Appendix summarizes the mathematical results for interested
readers.
The main body of this Article is divided into six parts. Part I
briefly examines the importance of formal modeling to procedural
analysis in general and to the regulation of frivolous suits in particu-
lar. Part II explores the difficulties in defining a "frivolous suit" and
proposes a working definition for the remainder of the Article.
Part III reviews standard models of frivolous litigation that assume
frivolous suits have positive expected value and argues that none is
robust enough to predict a serious frivolous suit problem. Parts IV
and V then examine a more promising class of models: those that
suppose frivolous suits have negative expected value. One type, which
is discussed in Part IV, assumes complete information-both parties
know whether a suit lacks merit. The other type, which is discussed in
Part V, assumes asymmetric information-one party knows but the
other does not.
As it turns out, complete information models provide only a weak
explanation of frivolous suits. Frivolous litigation is most likely to
occur under conditions of asymmetric information. Part V examines
two different asymmetric information models. It first describes
current models that assume the plaintiff knows her suit is frivolous
and the defendant does not, and then turns to my new model, which
explains frivolous filings when the asymmetry runs in the opposite
questionable account of human behavior. For an accessible survey of the many appli-
cations of game theory to law, see generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW (1994).
17 For a few examples of game-theoretic insights, see Avery Katz, The Effect of Fivo-
lous Suits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990) (predicting
that increasing filing costs will not deter frivolous suits); D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A
Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3
(1985) (predicting that plaintiffs might still file frivolous suits even when they know
defendants are aware that the suits are frivolous); Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information
Prior to Settlement or Litigation, 20 RANDJ. ECON. 183 (1989) (predicting that defendants
might voluntarily disclose incriminating information without the need for mandatory
discovery).
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direction-defendant knows and plaintiff does not unless she inves-
tigates. In this new model, plaintiffs sometimes sue without investi-
gating even when they have ample time, the cost is moderate, and
they know that frivolous suits always lose at trial and never receive a
positive settlement offer.
Both of the asymmetric information models discussed in Part V
are capable of explaining a potentially large number of frivolous
filings. However, these models point to a different sort of problem
than commonly supposed. The most serious effect of frivolous litiga-
tion is not the cost of actually litigating frivolous suits, but instead the
adverse impact on settlement of legitimate suits.
Part VI turns from prediction to policy prescription. I draw on
the formal analysis to outline a general approach to regulating frivo-
lous suits. In particular, I propose a way to determine whether suits
are frivolous based on a failure to investigate. Moreover, I argue
against uniform enforcement of a prohibition on frivolous suits and
in favor of a more targeted approach that varies with the litigation
context. Finally, I examine three enforcement alternatives and con-
clude that the more popular devices may not be as promising as gen-
erally believed and that a relatively neglected approach, judicial
screening, deserves more attention than it has received.
I. THE VALUE OF MODELS
A. Modeling in General
We rely on models all the time. By abstracting from the seem-
ingly chaotic details of real life, models make it possible to perceive
patterns otherwise hidden from view. Even when one does some-
thing as routine as changing lanes on a highway, one implicitly relies
on an abstract model of human behavior to anticipate the reactions of
other drivers. This model assumes, for instance, that other drivers
care about avoiding accidents, and that they can and will observe
one's behavior and respond rationally to it '1 As in this driver exam-
18 On the value of modeling, see DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC
MODELLNG 5-7, 87-89 (1990) and ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 2-4 (2d ed. 1994).
39 The model also assumes that road conditions will remain relatively smooth and
that the weather will not change abruptly. Of course, one can alter these assumptions
if one observes something unusual, such as a weaving car or a bumpy road. Even so,
the model does not always match reality; when the deviation is too large, a serious ac-
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ple, most models are not rigorously specified or technically precise
like the formal models I discuss in this Article. Still, informal models
are just like formal ones in the respect that makes modeling most
valuable: they abstract from reality to render complex problems in a
more tractable form.
Procedural analysis involves predicting the actions of parties in
highly complex litigation settings. Not surprisingly then, procedural-
ists use models all the time, whether they are aware of it or not.
Sometimes the use is explicit, as with the models discussed in this
Article. More often, however, it is implicit, as it is for our hypothetical
driver. For example, the seemingly straightforward prediction that
increasing the number of judges will reduce case backlog relies on a
simple model of the litigation process that assumes-incorrectly, as it
turns out-that the number of possible lawsuits is fixed.20 Similarly,
the assumption that relaxed summary judgment burdens will screen
21out weak cases without adversely affecting strong ones is based on a
model of the litigation process that unrealistically abstracts from set-
tlement.2 And again, the relatively common assumption that a one-
way offer-of-settlement rule like Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will encourage settlements by penalizing plaintiffs for re-
jecting reasonable offers3 implicitly relies on a model that ignores the
24interactional nature of settlement bargaining.
Still, some people object to formal models on the ground that
they abstract too much from context or make unrealistic assumptions
about human rationality. 25 These are important concerns,2r and a
cident can result.
20 See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 527, 533-35 (1989) (noting that speedier disposition of cases will attract more
suits into the system).
21 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (stressing the value of
summaryjudgment in weeding out meritless claims).
22 See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 74-75 (1990) (noting how a light summary judgment bur-
den can adversely affect settlement by giving the moving party a chance to impose
costs asymmetrically).
See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1985) (arguing that Rule 68 en-
courages settlement without affecting incentives to bring meritorious suits).
24 See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 94
(1986) (showing that settlement frequency is not likely to increase much, but settle-
ment amount is likely to drop).
Formal models of the litigation process assume that individuals are rational in
the special sense, associated with the theory of "rational choice," that they are able to
maximize expected payoffs in the face of uncertain options, or more technically, that
they maximize expected utility. See DAVID M. KRtEs, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC
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good modeler tries to take account of them. But it is also important
not to exaggerate the problems. For one thing, modeling assump-
tions may ,fit the competitive environment of litigation rather well,
given that lawyers are trained to make strategic choices in the face of
uncertainty.2s Moreover, when the fit is poor, the formal predictions
can sometimes be adjusted to reflect the deviation.9 Furthermore,
despite its limitations, this type of analysis is still the most rigorous
and powerful method we have to predict behavior," and prediction is
crucial to any policy analysis that counts consequences. Those who
would reject formal modeling have the burden to identify a workable
alternative that better fits what we know about the litigation environ-
ment. Thus far, no one has done so.
B. Modeling Frivolous Litigation
Modeling is particularly important for studying frivolous litigation
because of the many obstacles to reliable empirical work in the field.3'
THEORY 71-81 (1990) (describing the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of expected
utility). See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES
ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968) (providing a nontechnical account of the
rational choice model).
26 See, e.g., KREPS, supra note 25, at 112-20 (describing theoretical and empirical
reasons to be cautious about rational choice analysis); Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice
and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 487, 490-515 (1994) (discussing
anomalies in the theory of rational choice).
-7 See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and
the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 247-49 (1990) (also discussing spe-
cial limitations of game-theoretic methods).
28 Lawyers sometimes even use formal analysis explicitly. See Diane Goldner, Bor-
rowing a Tool from Business School; AM. LAW.,July-Aug. 1986, at 12-13.
See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 140-53 (1993) (demonstrating that the economic
analysis of settlement can be enhanced by considering the psychological factors influ-
encing parties' behaviors).
so SeeUlen, supra note 26, at 521.
31 Most of the empirical work to date relies on surveys, which are especially sensi-
tive to problems of respondent bias and framing. SeeJOHN SHAPARD ET AL., FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CIR., REPORT OF A SURVEY CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 3 tbls.1, 2 (1995) (survey of reactions to 1993 Rule 11 and its effect on
groundless litigation); WILLGING, supra note 12, at 3, 11 (survey of bench and bar re-
porting that 1983 Rule 11 reduced frivolous suits); Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues:
A Survey of State and Federal TrialJudges Who Spend at Least HaIf Their Time on General Civil
Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 735-36 tbls.1.1, 1.2 (1989) (Harris survey reporting that 21%
of federal judges and 14% of state judges believe frivolous litigation is a "major cause"
of delays); Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al.,JudicialAssessments of Rule 11: Its Effectiveness and
Its Impact on Litigation in Federal Court, FJC DIRECTIONS, Nov. 1991, at 28, 28-29 (survey
of federal judges reporting that most "do not find groundless litigation to be a prob-
19971
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One obstacle is the lack of a clear and generally accepted definition
of a "frivolous suit." Another is the tricky problem of how to deter-
mine whether any given suit is frivolous.32 This problem is particu-
larly acute because the most obvious source of information-judicial
determinations of frivolousness-is not likely to represent the case
population as a whole, and especially not cases that end in settle-
ment.33 Finally, researchers cannot easily obtain settlement data be-
cause parties often keep settlements confidential, 4 making it very dif-
ficult to test for what the models in this Article predict is one of the
most serious effects of frivolous litigation: the adverse impact on
settlement of legitimate suits.35
I am not suggesting that empirical work has nothing to offer.3 0
My point is that empiricism must be combined with formal analysis to
obtain a clear enough picture of frivolous litigation to guide respon-
sible regulation. Formal models can suggest testable hypotheses, and
when these hypotheses are confirmed by empirical data, greater reli-
lem in counseled cases"); cf. Marshall et al., supra note 12, at 953 (survey of practicing
lawyers reporting significant use of Rule 11).
32 For example, perhaps the most thorough empirical study of medical malprac-
tice litigation to date refused to draw any conclusions about frivolous litigation in part
because of difficulties in determining which suits were frivolous. See HARVARD
MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 7-27 to 7-35
(1990) (also noting small sample size).
33 Published opinions imposing sanctions are not representative of the population
of frivolous suits, and computerized databases are liable to be incomplete. See
STEPHEN B. BURBANK, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC'Y, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE
REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11,
at xiii (1989) (noting limitations of data); Wiggins et al., supra note 31, at 7 (noting
sharp differences in the rate of publication of Rule 11 opinions). Moreover, selection
effects make it unlikely that adjudicated cases reliably represent the population of suits
that settle. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Compliance with the Law and the Trial Selection
Process: A Theoretical Framework (1995) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the
"Conference on the Economics of Litigation," Dec. 1995, sponsored by the John M.
Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, Harvard Law School, on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (discussing the importance of selection effects).
34 The fact of settlement is often public information, but the amount usually is
not. Even if the researcher promises anonymity by reporting data only in the aggre-
gate, parties still have incentives not to cooperate, since all firms suffer if an industry
obtains a reputation for easy settlement.
35 See infra Part V.
For a good discussion of the importance of empirical work in litigation, see gen-
erally Deborah R. Hensler, Researching CivilJustice: Problems and Pitfalls, L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1988, at 55. Controlled laboratory simulations might be helpful, but
I am not aware of any such efforts. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Experimental Law and Economics: An Introduction, 85 COLUm. L. REV. 991 (1985)
(reviewing the use of experimental methodology in law and economics).
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S 37ance on the model and all of its predictions isjustified.
II. DEFINING "FRIVOLOUS SUITS"
Most commentators use the term "frivolous suit" without defining
it, as if the meaning were obvious to all. But the concept is quite slip-
pery. In the following discussion, I use examples to test several possi-
ble definitions of frivolousness in an effort to develop an attractive
and relatively uncontroversial core notion for the rest of this Article.
One possible definition equates frivolousness with negative ex-
pected value suits; that is, suits in which the expected trial award is
too small to cover plaintiffs litigation costs. I use the idea of
"expected value" throughout this Article, so it is important to define it
here. The expected value of an uncertain future outcome, such as
the outcome of a trial, is defined as the value of that outcome if it
happens, multiplied by the probability that it will happen. Thus, ig-
noring litigation costs for the moment, the expected value to the
plaintiff of winning at trial is the value of the likely trial award if she
wins, multiplied by the probability of winning. Similarly, the ex-
pected value to the plaintiff of losing at trial is the value of a loss (zero
here), multiplied by the probability of losing. The expected value of
trial in general, before subtracting for litigation costs, is the sum of
the expected values of the two possible trial outcomes. 40 Thus, when
litigation costs exceed the expected value of trial-in other words,
when the lawsuit has negative expected value 4'-a rational plaintiff
will never actually try the case, and so will file only if she believes
there is a good chance of obtaining a settlement.
42
37 See generally ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL
RESOURCES (1994) (reviewing empirical research testing game-theoretic work on
common-pool problems). For more on combining modeling and empirical research,
see infra Part VI.A.I.
For example, if the likely trial award is $50,000 and the probability of winning is
80%, then the expected value of winning (ignoring litigation costs) is: 80% X $50,000
= $40,000.
39 Thus, if the probability of losing is 20%, the expected value of a loss is:
20% x $0 = $0.
40 Carrying forward the example in footnotes 38 and 39, the expected value of trial
(ignoring litigation costs) is: $40,000 + $0 = $40,000.
41 To complete the example in the previous three footnotes, assume the plaintiff's
litigation costs are $45,000. Then the net expected value of trial is $40,000 - $45,000 =
-$5000, and the lawsuit has negative expected value.
42 Technically, expected value works only for risk-neutral plaintiffs, while most
people are probably risk-averse. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw
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Frivolousness, however, is not the same thing as negative ex-
pected value. To see this, consider a products liability case in which
plaintiff expects a trial award of $500,000 if she wins and estimates
her probability of winning at 60%. Suppose that litigation costs are
very high-estimated at $350,000-because of the need to address
complex scientific issues. Even though the suit has negative expected
value due to the high litigation costs, 43 the merits are too substantial
to warrant the label frivolous.44
This example suggests a second possible definition: A lawsuit is
frivolous whenever the probability of success is very small. This is an
improvement, but it is still unsatisfactory. To see why, consider a
variation on the products liability example. Suppose the case is ex-
tremely weak on the merits, so weak in fact that the plaintiff, who has
access to all of the important evidence, believes that there is only a
5% chance that the defendant actually did the acts in question. Sup-
pose further that juries in the particular jurisdiction are unusually
prone to error and that their errors tend to be strongly biased in
plaintiffs' favor. Confident in her trial strategy and expecting a favor-
12-13 (4th ed. 1992) (explaining risk preferences). Nevertheless, little of importance
is lost by using the concept of expected value. Any lawsuit with negative expected
value is also not worth trying for a risk-averse plaintiff, since an uncertain trial award is
worth less to a risk-averse party than to a risk-neutral party. See id. at 557. Further-
more, in a contingency fee case, much of the litigation risk is borne by the lawyer,
who, because of his ability to pool cases to minimize overall risk, is likely to have pref-
erences more closely aligned with risk neutrality. See id at 567; see alsoJohn C. Coffee,
Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney. The Implications of Economic Theory for Private En-
forcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 705-06
(1986) (describing the effect of an attorney's ability to diversify risk, but also question-
ing the assumption of risk neutrality for small firms).
43 (60% x $500,000) + (40% x $0) - $350,000 = -$50,000.
44 To condemn this suit as frivolous, one would have to believe that suits with posi-
tive expected value from a plaintiff's subjective point of view are the only suits that
should consume the resources of a publicly subsidized court system. This is an ex-
tremely difficult position to defend on normative grounds. It is especially problematic
for anyone who believes that litigation is about enforcing individual rights, but it is
also problematic for someone who views litigation in efficiency terms. After all, a suit
that has negative expected value to a plaintiff might have positive value to society once
externalized public benefits are taken into account. For example, a civil rights or en-
vironmental case that seeks broad injunctive relief can help a widely-dispersed group
or establish new law benefitting the public as a whole. See generally Steven Shavell, The
Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
333 (1982) (noting that lawsuits create external social benefits in terms of enhanced
incentives to invest in precaution, while also creating external social costs such as liti-
gation expenses for the defendant and the court system); Louis Kaplow, Private Versus
Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1986) (elaborating on Shavell's ar-
guments and answering his critics).
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able jury, the plaintiff estimates her probability of winning at 80%, an
estimate that makes the subjective expected value of her suit positive.
I believe that most people would classify this suit as frivolous, notwith-
standing the high probability of success, because of the extremely low
likelihood that the defendant is in fact liable.
What matters, therefore, is not a plaintiffs subjective estimate of
trial success, but instead a plaintiff's belief about whether a defendant
is in fact liable. This suggests a third possible definition: A lawsuit is
frivolous if a plaintiff files suit believing that there is only a very small
likelihood that the defendant is liable. This definition comes close to
capturing part of what we mean by frivolous, but it too needs further
refinement.
Consider a civil rights test case in which the defendant is clearly
not liable under established law, but the plaintiff advances a novel le-
gal theory strongly at odds with settled precedent. One might call
this suit "frivolous" if one believes that courts should be used to
change the law only when precedent provides strong support for the
change. On the other hand, one might treat the suit as legitimate if
one believes that the growth of civil rights law depends on the will-
ingness of lawyers to bring test cases that challenge established prece-
dent.4 5
As this example makes clear, we label a lawsuit "frivolous" not
simply to say something about its merits, but to express a normative
judgment that suit should not be brought. Because it ultimately rests
on a view of the proper function of adjudication, this normative
judgment can be controversial at times. This helps explain why it is
so difficult to define frivolousness. People disagree about the condi-
tions for legitimate suits, and at the deepest level, their disagreement
implicates differing views about the value of adjudication.
Even so, I believe our third definition can be modified to capture
a relatively uncontroversial sense of frivolousness: A lawsuit is frivo-
lous if a plaintiff files suit knowing facts that decisively establish little
or no chance of the defendant's objective liability on the basis of any of
the legal theories plaintiff alleges.' Here, the relevant knowledge con-
cerns the defendant's objective liability, not the plaintiff's subjective
43 See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 574-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(recognizing the importance of permitting novel legal arguments and not discourag-
ing Zarticular types of litigation when creating a standard for frivolousness).
This is the classic case of a "bad faith" filing and is sanctionable in federal court
under FED. R. CIV. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994).
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evaluation of trial success. 47 The italicized portion is meant to avoid
the civil rights controversy by focusing attention on the substantive
law that the plaintiff actually invokes. While there is bound to be
disagreement over how "little" a chance is too little, there is also likely
to be a threshold below which almost everyone would agree that a suit
is frivolous.
This definition, however, is still not complete. It omits a second
category that fits neatly into the idea of frivolousness. This second
category, which is recognized by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,48 includes lawsuits that the plaintiff files without conduct-
ing a reasonable prefiling investigation when such an investigation
would have revealed facts establishing little or no chance that the de-
fendant was actually liable on any of the legal theories alleged. In this
second category, the plaintiff is faulted for an unreasonable failure to
investigate, rather than, as in the first category, for a knowingly frivo-
lous filing. There are bound to be disputes over what qualifies as
"reasonable, 4 9 of course, but disputes of this kind presume agree-
ment on the general definition.5 0
47 This means that the facts must be such as to convince a person who knew every-
thing about the case. For example, plaintiff might sue on a products liability theory,
knowing for certain that he never used defendant's product. In circumstances where
the facts are not so clear, however, frivolousness must be determined by reference to
the quality of the plaintiff's prefiling investigation.
What if plaintiff, convinced that her suit lacks merit, files anyway in the hope of
forcing a settlement, but later discovers facts that show a strong likelihood of liability?
I believe most people would give plaintiff the benefit of her luck. Cf Sussman v. Bank
of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 457-59 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that no Rule 11 violation existed
for filing with an improper purpose when suit was otherwise meritorious). The ques-
tion of whether a plaintiff's suit is frivolous is similar to the question of whether a per-
son is culpably negligent when her unreasonable conduct creates a risk but no tangi-
ble harm. The plaintiff's filing decision was unreasonable given her knowledge at the
time of filing, but it ultimately caused no harm to the defendant, who was legitimately
subject to suit all along. Cf. Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for
Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 469-73 (1990) (suggesting that corrective justice
theories support tort liability whenever one's actions increase the risk of harm, regard-
less of whether harm actually materializes).
48 See FED. R. CIrv. P. 11 (b) (3) (requiring an inquiry reasonable under the circum-
stances and a belief that factual allegations have evidentiary support or are likely to
have evidentiary support).
49 But there are certain to be easy cases at the extremes. See GEORGENE M. VAIRO,
RULE 11 SANCTtONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES § 5.03 [b] [2],
at 5-21 (Supp. 1994) (noting that most courts sanction attorneys when they fail to in-
quire at all into the factual and legal bases for a claim, defense or motion).
3o See infra Parts V.B.3 (defining reasonableness), VI.A.2 (operationalizing the
definition).
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Therefore, the definition of frivolous suit that I adopt for this Ar-
ticle includes two prongs: A suit is frivolous (1) when a plaintiff files
knowing facts that establish complete (or virtually complete) absence of merit as
an objective matter on the legal theories alleged, or (2) when a plaintiff files
without conducting a reasonable investigation which, if conducted, would
place the suit in prong (1). At the same time, however, it is important to
remember that this definition states only sufficient, and not neces-
sary, conditions for frivolousness. For instance, it does not include
cases deemed "frivolous" because of unsound legal arguments rather
than thin facts;51 nor does it include legally meritorious cases labeled
"frivolous" because of a belief that plaintiff is too litigious.52 It does,
however, permit us to address one of the most important complaints
about the civil justice system-that there are too many factually
groundless suits.
51 See, e.g., Land v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 25 F.3d 509, 517-18 (7th Cir. 1994)
(imposing Rule 11 sanctions on the ground that the party advancing a legal theory
must reasonably investigate that theory's viability before forcing an opponent to de-
fend against the claim); Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1006-07
(7th Cir. 1994) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions for the attorney's failure to research the
appropriate law before asking for liquidated and exemplary damages under a statute
which clearly did not allow the recovery of such damages). Nevertheless, the models
discussed in this Article can be adapted to deal with cases involving unsound legal ar-
guments, provided one first defines precisely when a claim is legally insufficient. See
infra note 190 (discussing the definitional problem).
52 To illustrate, suppose that A builds a fence that encroaches two inches over the
property line of his neighbor B. B has a meritorious suit in trespass against A to obtain
damages and perhaps even injunctive relief. See, e.g., Goulding v. Cook, 645 N.E.2d 54,
55-56 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (recognizing that a landowner is entitled at least to dam-
ages for an encroachment on his property); Tramonte v. Colarusso, 152 N.E. 90, 91
(Mass. App. Ct. 1926) (allowing the plaintiff to recover at least nominal damages, even
though "the invasion of the plaintiff's rights were trifling"). Nevertheless, I believe
that many people would consider it a sign of excessive litigiousness and a breach of
neighborly norms for B to sue, and some might even refer to B's suit as "frivolous" in
view of the insignificance of the encroachment. Cf ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 52-64 (1991) (noting strong norms
among Shasta County cattle herders against using courts to resolve disputes). This
sentiment may partially account for the intense public reaction to cases reported to
the press as "frivolous." One of the most notorious recent examples is the
"McDonald's hot coffee case." See Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No.
CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994) (reporting the jury's findings,
including the compensatory damages award of $160,000 and the punitive damages
award of $2.7 million); David G. Savage, GOP Targeting Huge Punitive Damage Awards,
LA. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1994, at Al (reporting on criticisms of suits like McDonald's). Dis-
gust with the McDonald's litigation may have less to do with the legal merits and more
to do with a pervasive feeling that it is simply unreasonable to sue over something as
common as hot coffee.
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III. PosITivE EXPECTED VALUE MODELS
All the formal models discussed in this Article are efforts to an-
swer the central questions of frivolous litigation: Why would a ration-
al plaintiff ever file a frivolous suit, and why would a defendant ever
settle? One answer assumes that frivolous suits have positive expected
value ("PEV"). I discuss these PEV models briefly in this Part before
turning to a more plausible class of models, those that assume frivo-
lous suits have negative expected value ("NEV"). My purpose here
and elsewhere is to determine how serious a frivolous suit problem
the various models predict and how strong a case each makes for
regulation.S
There are two ways for a frivolous suit to be PEV: (1) the plaintiff
might expect substantial nonlegal benefits, or (2) the courts might
make mistakes sufficiently often to create a high likelihood of trial
success even in a meritless suit.54  However, neither explanation
points clearly to a serious enough frivolous suit problem to warrant
regulatory intervention.
The first explanation fits some, but not many, types of litigation.
Occasionally plaintiffs file meritless suits just to impose litigation or
reputation costs on opponents, hoping to secure some political or
business advantage." Examples include suits to delay hostile take-
overs, scuttle a competitor's business plans, frustrate a project or po-
litical cause, or embarrass a political opponent or personal enemy.56
Although there is evidence that strategic litigation of this sort is on
3 Therefore, I assume that the American rule on attorneys' fees is in place and
that there is no regulation specially designed to deter frivolous suits (such as Rule 11
penalties).
Of course, a meritless suit might also seem to have positive expected value when
in fact it does not if the plaintiff is unaware of damaging evidence. This situation im-
plicates the reasonableness of the plaintiff's prefiling investigation. See infra Part
V.B.3.
5 Suits brought by plaintiffs who like to litigate belong here as well. These suits
should be rare, however, since few people are likely to have strong enough tastes for
litigation tojustify the high cost.
6 See RonaldJ. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Laryers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 536-37 (1994)
(discussing "strategic litigation," which seeks to secure advantages for the plaintiff
rather than vindicate legal rights); Thomas A. Waldman, Comment, SLAPP Suits:
Weaknesses in First Amendment Law and in the Courts' Response to Fivolous Litigation, 39
UCLA L. REV. 979, 985-86 (1992) (arguing that a desire to forestall political activism
motivates business interests to initiate "strategic lawsuits against public participation,"
so called "SLAPPs").
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the rise today, 57 I am not aware of any hard data showing how com-
mon it is or how much of it is meritless58 One thing, however, is
clear: public concern about frivolous suits focuses not on these cases,
but on those such as tort, securities and civil rights suits that are
brought to obtain settlements rather than to harass.59
The second explanation has a potentially broader reach. If trial
error is high enough, the trial award large enough, and litigation
costs small enough, expected trial recovery can exceed costs even for
a completely meritless suit.6 The problem with this argument, how-
ever, is its premise: the probability of trial error is not likely to be
substantial enough in frivolous suits. Indeed, even if error rates are
relatively high in the ordinary case, they can still be very low in a frivo-
lous suit-too low to make suit PEV. The reason is that a factfinder is
much less likely to make a mistake when the evidence is strongly
skewed in the defendant's favor, as in a meritless suit, than when the
57 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 56, at 537.
5s When such a suit has legal merit, my definition of frivolous does not apply de-
spite the plaintiff's questionable motives. This is at least consistent with the view of
those courts that refuse to impose Rule 11 sanctions when plaintiffs file otherwise le-
gitimate claims for arguably improper purposes. See, e.g., Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56
F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 1995) ("A party should not be penalized for or deterred from
seeking and obtaining warranted judicial relief merely because one of his multiple
purposes in seeking that relief may have been improper."); Townsend v. Holman Con-
suiting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that "it would be coun-
terproductive to use Rule 11 to penalize the assertion of non-frivolous substantive
claims, even when the motives for asserting those claims are not entirely pure"); Na-
tional Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d 216,
222-23 (5th Cir. 1988) (refusing to impose sanctions despite evidence of malice and
harassment because the complaint was nonetheless justified). But see Szabo Food
Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that Rule 11
targets a "colorable suit" brought "for the purpose of imposing expense on the defen-
dant").
59 See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 1, at 254-70 (giving examples of frivolous suits, most
of which fall into this category). These cases are also the principal focus of recent
congressional activity. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
For models that rely on this explanation of frivolous filings, see Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory:
On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 376
(1996) (analyzing fee shifting as a way to deter frivolous plaintiffs who sue to exploit
trial error) and A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An
Economic Analysis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397, 404-06 (1993) (analyzing the Rule 11 sanctioning
process for frivolous suits with positive expected value because of trial error).
61 Consider a suit in which plaintiff knows defendant is clearly not liable. If courts
make mistakes, plaintiff (7t) will sue when:
(probability of error) X (trial award) > (it's litigation costs).
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evidence is more or less balanced between the parties.r2
By our definition of frivolous, there must be evidence that
strongly favors the defendant-so strongly that a rational plaintiff
must be able to conclude with a high degree of confidence that the
defendant is, in fact, not liable. For a plaintiff to assume at the same
time that the risk of trial error is high, she must believe that any ex-
onerating evidence will remain hidden or that an ordinary factfinder
will mistake its significance. Neither belief is terribly plausible in a
frivolous suit.
If a defendant is aware of exonerating evidence, as should often
be the case after discovery, a factfinder is not likely to overlook its sig-
nificance since the defendant will present it clearly. 3 Of course, the
defendant may never learn about the evidence. Defendant ignorance
is most likely to occur in cases where the plaintiff has exclusive con-
trol over the evidence and is willing to lie despite the risk of criminal
and civil penalties. 4 However, if blatant lying were frequent-as it
would have to be for PEV frivolous suits to pose a serious problem-
defendants would have strong incentives to cross-examine vigorously
and attack the plaintiffs credibility in every case.6 Although lying is
bound to succeed sometimes, occasional success will not make such
suits PEV. A rational party will focus on the average, not the excep-
62 In technical terms, the average error risk is actually the mean of a distribution of
different risks across lawsuits of varying strength. As a result, the average risk can be
quite high while the risk for frivolous suits located at the left tail of the distribution is
very low.
The plaintiffs lawyer will do everything in her power to cast doubt on the evi-
dence, but she is not likely to succeed very often when the evidence is clearly exoner-
ating. Indeed, I imagine that the chance of tricking ajury is substantial only in a rela-
tively complex case. But the more complex the case, the higher the trial costs, and the
higher the trial costs, the higher the error rate needed tojustify suit for a fixed award.
See supra note 61.
64 Consider a case where a plaintiff trips over her shoelaces and falls in a grocery
aisle without any witnesses, and then falsely claims to have slipped on a puddle of wa-
ter negligently left unattended. Here, the plaintiffs testimony is the only evidence on
the critical issue of causation.
6, Lying might be more successful on issues as to which the defendant has the
burdens of production and persuasion at trial. If plaintiffs have better access to the
evidence, however, this fact would weigh in favor of assigning the burdens to them. See
Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions, Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal Civil Actions-An
Anatomy of Unnecessary Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 892, 896
(1982) (noting that the "burden of production in some classes of cases may be placed




I do not mean that frivolous suits can never be PEV. My point is
simply that the PEV segment of frivolous litigation is not likely to be
serious enough by itself to warrant costly regulatory intervention-or
so it seems in the absence of evidence to the contrary. But this is not
all there is to frivolous litigation. Plaintiffs file frivolous suits when
they are NEV, and it is in those cases that the most serious problems
are likely to arise.
IV. NEGATivE EXPECTED VALUE MODELS: COMPLETE INFORMATION
There are several models of NEV litigation that explain frivolous
filings in different ways. These models vary according to the assump-
tions they make about the parties' information. "Complete informa-
tion" models assume that the plaintiff and defendant both know that
the suit is frivolous. "Asymmetric information" models, by contrast,
assume one party knows and the other does not. I briefly discuss
complete information models in this section, and then, in Part V, I
turn to the asymmetric information models.
In some types of litigation, information about liability is likely to
be complete (or almost complete) from the outset. Consider a
breach of contract dispute between a property owner and a contractor
over whether a building has been constructed according to specifica-
tions. Suppose the contractor insists that he substantially performed,
and the owner disagrees. Both parties should have all relevant infor-
mation about liability; contract interpretation, after all, turns on ob-
jective manifestations of intent and each party knows the history of
negotiations and the current condition of the building. As a result,
both parties should know from the beginning whether the suit is
frivolous.
In the simplest version of a complete information model, devel-
oped by Professors Rosenberg and Shavell,67 the plaintiff files suit be-
cause he expects an early settlement, and the defendant settles be-
cause settlement is cheaper than making a formal response. To
illustrate, suppose it costs a plaintiff $500 to file a frivolous suit that
seeks $50,000 in damages, and it costs defendant $1000 to respond to
66 A rational plaintiff also takes account of the risk of being penalized for perjury.
This risk increases the cost of litigating, thereby reducing the expected value of suit,
and can even turn a PEV suit into an NEV suit if detection is frequent enough.
67 See Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 17, at 3.
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the complaint by formal answer or motion. Suppose further that the
defendant must either respond or suffer a default judgment in the
amount of $50,000. Under these circumstances, defendant should be
willing to pay up to $1000 in settlement, even though she knows that
the suit is frivolous and that the plaintiff will drop the suit if she
makes a formal response. After all, settlement in an amount up to
$1000 is less than the cost of a formal response ($1000) and certainly
less than the cost of default ($50,000). Knowing this about the de-
fendant, the frivolous plaintiff will file suit, since he expects a settle-
ment ($1000) in excess of his filing cost ($500).
While this model might explain some frivolous filings, it cannot
account for a serious frivolous suit problem. For one thing, unjusti-
fied wealth transfers? in the ,form of settlement payments to frivolous
plaintiffs should be individually quite small in magnitude, since settle-
ments are capped at the relatively low cost of filing an answer (or a
motion to dismiss).0 After all, the defendant knows all the material
facts and need not worry about preparing for trial, so she should be
able to get away with making simple denials. Furthermore, the
68 By a "wealth transfer," I mean any payment from one party to another. Wealth
transfers are "unjustified" when the payment is made to a party who is not entitled to
it. For example, an "unjustified wealth transfer" occurs anytime a meritless suit settles
for a positive amount. The phrase is meant to be general enough to encompass all
possible normative reasons for objection, including adverse impacts on ex ante incen-
tives and the moral injustice of the resulting redistribution.
69 If a defendant files a motion to dismiss in federal court, she need not file an an-
swer until the motion is denied. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a). Whether the defendant files
a motion or an answer, the ball returns to the plaintiff, who must then invest an addi-
tional sum in order to advance the litigation. Moreover, defendants usually benefit
from delay, see Coffee, supra note 42, at 703, and thus should be happy to wait until the
plaintiff makes the next move. If the plaintiff does nothing, the court will dismiss the
action for want of prosecution. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962)
("The authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff's action with prejudice be-
cause of his failure to prosecute cannot seriously be doubted.").
70 In fact, if the cost of responding is less than the cost of filing, settlements would
be too small to attract any frivolous suits. Furthermore, in actual litigation, both par-
ties have bargaining power at the settlement stage, so any settlement should fall
somewhere between zero (the amount the plaintiff accepts when the defendant has all
the bargaining power) and the cost of an answer or motion (the amount the defen-
dant accepts when the plaintiff has all the power, as the Rosenberg-Shavell model
assumes). See Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 17, at 4-5. As a result, any settlement is
likely to be less than the defendant's response cost, and therefore frivolous suits will
be even less profitable than the Rosenberg-Shavell model supposes. For example, if
the two parties in our hypothetical have equal bargaining power, the expected settle-
ment should be roughly $500 (one-half of the $1000 response cost), not enough to
make suit profitable when plaintiff must spend $500 to file.
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model predicts very little in the way of wasted litigation costs, 7' since
all frivolous suits should settle shortly after filing.7
More complex models might improve somewhat on these predic-
tions, but they do not clearly point to a serious frivolous suit prob-
lem.7s Moreover, under complete information, there is a way for de-
fendants to deal with frivolous suits on their own whenever they
7 Litigation costs are "wasted" whenever the presence of frivolous suits causes par-
ties to invest more in litigation than they otherwise would.
7. Rationally, all frivolous suits should settle before filing. See Rosenberg & Shavell,
supra note 17, at 11 n.5. Both parties know that the suit is frivolous and settlement in-
evitable, so both know that a prefiling settlement can save the cost of filing. Moreover,
the usual reasons for settlement failure are not strongly implicated here, since transac-
tion costs are low and there is no reason for plaintiff to worry about signaling weak-
ness.
73 For example, Professor Lucian Bebchuk has developed a model that shows how
an NEV plaintiff might be able to force a defendant to litigate stage-by-stage all the way
through trial. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Suc-
cess of Threats to Sue 25J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996). While this model has important im-
plications for nonfrivolous NEV suits, its predictions for frivolous suits approximate
those of the Rosenberg-Shavell model. For one thing, wasted litigation costs are not a
problem in the Bebchuk model because settlements always take place shortly after fil-
ing. Moreover, settlement amounts should be small in frivolous suits, especially in
view of the possibility of summary judgment and the availability of defensive measures
that can increase plaintiff's costs. See, e.g., Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 353
(6th Cir. 1989) (holding that appellant "failed to present 'specific facts' sufficient to
defeat [a]ppellees' motion for summary judgment"); Contemporary Mission, Inc. v.
United States Postal Serv., 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a party cannot
defeat a motion for summary judgment by speculating "about what discovery might
uncover"); 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2036-
37 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing bases for resisting discovery and grounds for obtaining
protective orders). With a likelihood of summary judgment and a prospect of high
costs at some litigation stage prior to trial, a frivolous plaintiff will have difficulty mak-
ing a credible threat to litigate each stage (unless the stakes are unusually high), and
without such a threat, settlement is likely to be close to the Rosenberg-Shavell amount.
See Bebchuk, supra, at 14 (stressing the importance of credible threats).
There is a possible exception to this analysis. Bebchuk shows that if there is a
stage where the plaintiff can force the defendant to invest without having to invest
himself-what Bebchuk calls a "cost-free stage"--then the plaintiff can extract a set-
tlement in an amount less than or equal to the difference between the defendant's
and the plaintiff's anticipated litigation costs aggregated up to the cost-free stage. See
Bebchuk, supra, at 20-22. For settlements to be substantial, however, costs must be
highly asymmetric, and the parties must anticipate a cost-free stage late enough in the
litigation for the cost differential to be large (yet early enough to precede a summary
judgment). If litigation resembles a tennis match, with each return of the ball a sepa-
rate stage, there would be many cost-free stages. But if litigation mostly involves con-
current moves from stage to stage, as I believe it does, then cost-free stages should be
rare after the close of pleadings. To take one example, discovery requests are nor-
mally concurrent: parties propound requests on one another at roughly the same
time.
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expect repeated filings.74 By litigating instead of settling the first few
frivolous suits, a repeat-player defendant can build, a reputation for
fighting.7 Once established, this reputation will signal other frivolous
plaintiffs not to expect a settlement, and so they will not sue. Because
the gain from avoiding future settlements is likely to exceed the loss
from litigating a few frivolous suits,7 defendants should find it opti-
77mal to employ a fighting strategy in many cases.
A fighting strategy can succeed, however, only when there is an
effective mechanism for distributing reputational information. Dis-
tribution to corporate plaintiffs is not a problem because, as repeat
players, they have the incentive and wherewithal to become informed.
74 See Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 17, at 10 n.3 (recognizing this possibility);
Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L..REV. 1113, 1160 & n.118 (1990) (noting
that insurance companies sometimes have incentives to litigate rather than settle in
order to establish a tough reputation).
75 It is possible that reputation effects might work on both sides of a lawsuit, but I
believe this is rare. After all, a plaintiff's attorney would have to be willing to cultivate
an unsavory and highly public reputation for litigating frivolous suits. By contrast, a
defendant's reputation for fighting is perfectly consistent with high standards of pro-
fessional conduct.
76 This point is difficult to demonstrate rigorously without technical game-
theoretic tools, see RASMUSEN, supra note 18, at 121-31, but it should be intuitively
clear. In order for future settlements to have a significant impact on defendant's
current incentives, the total amount of all future settlements must be very large. But
in that case a defendant should be willing to invest in fighting a lot of frivolous suits if
by doing so he could avoid paying large settlement amounts in future suits. A simple
numerical example might help. Suppose a defendant expects to pay $50,000 to settle
a frivolous suit and $20,000 to litigate. Suppose that the defendant also discounts the
future by 90% (in other words, one dollar paid out one year hence costs defendant
only 90 cents today). Assuming a continuous stream of frivolous filings, one each year,
it can be shown that the present value of all future settlements is $500,000. Even ig-
noring the discount factor, the defendant should be willing to litigate 24 frivolous suits
at $20,000 per suit to establish a reputation of fighting suits if it means that the rest of
the frivolous filings would be deterred (since 24 x $20,000 = $480,000, which is less
than $500,000).
77Without getting too deeply into the technicalities of game theory, it is worth
mentioning that a fighting strategy might require an indefinite string of potential
frivolous suits. This condition is not absolutely essential in true reputation models,
but it is necessary to game-theoretic models that depend not on reputation but on a
party's ability to punish deviations from a desired equilibrium. See RASMUSEN, supra
note 18, at 121-31, 154-56. Fortunately, we need not worry about this technicality,
since there is an indefinite string of frivolous suits whenever the defendant is a corpo-
ration with an indefinite life. As a matter of fact, the suits need not all be of the same
type, since a reputation for fighting frivolous suits in general should reap benefits in
any frivolous suit. Nor need the suits be infinitely numerous; it is enough that the par-
ties to any frivolous suit assign a positive probability to the filing of yet another. See id
at 125-26.
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Distribution to individual, one-shot plaintiffs, however, could be more
difficult, except for the fact that the plaintiffs lawyer is well posi-
tioned to act as an informational conduit. Lawyers usually have access
to reputational information through professional publications and
personal contacts, and they have a strong incentive to screen frivolous
suits, at least in contingency fee cases.78 Indeed, reputational infor-
mation is part of a lawyer's general litigating capital, which is capable
of generating returns in legitimate suits as well. As a result, lawyers
have an incentive to become informed even when doing so is costly.0O
Thus, complete information models do not provide a convincing
explanation for why frivolous suits are problematic, at least not an ex-
planation that justifies costly regulatory intervention. According to
these models, frivolous suits all settle early, producing little in the way
of wasted litigation costs, and settlements are likely to be quite small
unless, for some reason, the stakes are unusually high. Moreover, de-
fendants in some (perhaps many) cases should be able to deter frivo-
lous suits on their own by using a fighting strategy.
78 After all, a lawyer at risk for fees is not likely to take a suit with little chance of
success (unless for some reason the client tries to conceal the weakness and succeeds).
See Kevin M. Clermont &John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee; 63 CORNELL
L. REV. 529, 571-72 (1978) (arguing that a contingent fee does not necessarily encour-
age, and may well discourage, frivolous suits). It is significant, therefore, that many
plaintiffs hire lawyers on contingency. See id at 531 n.2 (noting that most personal
injury cases are on contingency); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litiga-
tion, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 111-12 (1983) (reporting that 71% of plaintiffs in a statistical
sample hired lawyers on contingency). Attorneys paid on a fee-for-services basis might
be more willing to file frivolous suits just to earn the fees, see Clermont & Currivan,
supra, at 572, but this incentive should be reduced somewhat by the lawyer's interest in
maintaining a good reputation.
79 Agency problems might frustrate a fighting strategy if corporate officers and in-
house counsel prefer for some reason to settle frivolous suits even when fighting is
better for the company as a whole. See generally POSNER, supra note 42, at 391-92
(discussing agency problems in the firm). I am not aware of any empirical data on this
problem, but even if the problem were significant, there are sound reasons to rely on
private solutions rather than public regulation. Companies have incentives to monitor
their agents and are generally in a superior position to identify the source of the prob-
lem and correct it.
80 These conclusions assume that litigation is very costly. When it is not, the risk of
frivolous suits can be quite high. For example, if frivolous litigation by prisoners is a
problem today, it is largely because prisoners incur little, if any, cost when they file pro
se. See, e.g., Young v. Corbin, 889 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that the
pro se plaintiff had filed 12 lawsuits, many of which were dismissed as frivolous). See
generally Ana Puga, House GOP Aims to Halt Trvolous' Prison Litigation, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 5, 1995, at 2 (reporting on the congressional attempts to curb frivolous suits). A
prisoner who knows that a suit is frivolous might sue just to play the odds, strike back
at the state, pass the time, or even get a day outside the prison walls. Of course, state
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V. NEGATIVE EXPECTED VALUE MODELS: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
For a more plausible account, we must relax the assumption of
complete information.8' One way to do this is to suppose that the
plaintiff knows his suit is frivolous, but that the defendant does not. I
call this the "informed-plaintiff model." A second way is to suppose
that the defendant knows, but the plaintiff does not unless he investi-
gates. I call this the "informed-defendant model." The following dis-
cussion describes each of these two asymmetric information models
in turn, first illustrating the model's intuition with a simple narrative,
and then briefly describing its formal structure and predictions. The
discussion closes with a critical examination of the reliability of both
models and an overall summary of their most important predictions.
A. The Informed-Plaintiff Model
The informed-plaintiff model fits a number of different litigation
settings-for example, a negligence suit in which liability turns on
contributory negligence and in which the defendant cannot observe
the plaintiffs conduct, or a products liability case in which the plain-
tiff knows he did not use the defendant's product."2 These models
have received a fair amount of attention in the law and economics lit-
erature. The following analysis is based on a model developed by
Professor Avery Katz. 4
defendants should often be able to get early summary judgment, or possibly even dis-
missal, when the plaintiff is proceeding informa pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, espe-
cially with the qualified immunity defense, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-
19 (1982) (detailing the elements of a qualified immunity defense), and heightened
pleading standards, see Blum, supra note 4, at 59, 59-61 (discussing the use of a height-
ened pleading standard to "weed out frivolous claims"). But litigation costs might still
be a serious problem in the aggregate, since a fighting strategy is useless against low-
cost plaintiffs.
Option theory might provide an alternative way to explain frivolous filings. See
Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
173, 187 (1990) (summarizing option theory). However, it is too early to assess the
promise of option theory, especially as proponents have yet to consider the effects of
strategic interaction. Id at 174.
82
See, e.g.,Jones v. International Riding Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692, 695 (11th Cir.
1995) (affirming the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in a products liability case in
which the plaintiff's attorney knew that the helmet plaintiff used was manufactured
before the defendant company existed).
83 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 437 (1988); Katz, supra note 17.
84 See Katz, supra note 17.
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1. A Simple Narrative: John v. Mary
To see intuitively what might happen when plaintiffs are in-
formed, consider the following simple hypothetical. One day while
shopping at a neighborhood grocery store owned by Mary, John
tripped over his shoelaces, fracturing his elbow and sustaining some
permanent injury. No one observed John's fall, and it occurred to
him that he might claim that he slipped on-a nearby puddle of water
and collect damages from Mary.
Suppose John is not willing to lie under oath, so trial is out of the
question. Assume that both Mary and John consult attorneys who
have considerable experience with personal injury cases, especially
slip-and-fall suits, and thatJohn's attorney is not averse to filing frivo-
lous suits if a profit can be made. Both attorneys rely on their experi-
ence to estimate trial success, the likely jury verdict, and expected liti-
gation costs for the average legitimate slip-and-fall case. Assume that
the attorneys have similar experience and so make the same esti-
mates, which are as follows: (1) legitimate plaintiffs prove lack of
reasonable care, on average, 80% of the time at trial; (2) the average
jury verdict awards $50,000 for injuries like John's; and (3) the aver-
age case costs $1000 to file and $10,000 for each side to litigate
through trial.
What will the parties do? For ease of exposition, I shall refer to
the decisionmakers as 'John" and "Mary" even though I mean to in-
clude their attorneys as well. John asks himself whether he should
sue, knowing that his case is frivolous and has no chance of success at
trial. Mary asks herself whether to offer a settlement and in what
amount. However, unlike John, Mary does not know for sure whether
the suit is frivolous. The parties reflect on their options as follows:' 5
John reflects: I certainly don't want to sue if Mary will just
refuse to settle. After all, it will cost me $1000 to file, and I
get nothing unless Mary makes a settlement offer. But there
is hope because Mary doesn't know whether my suit is frivo-
lous. Of course, if she believes that the vast majority of suits
are frivolous, then she might not be willing to settle at all.
But if instead she believes that most suits are legitimate, then
she might be willing to make a high offer in order to avoid
85 1 am deeply indebted to my colleague, Joe Brodley, for his invaluable assistance
with this narrative as well as those in infra PartV.B.1.
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the risk of spending $10,000 for trial.
Mary reflects: I have no idea whether John's suit is frivo-
lous. If his suit has merit, I should certainly make an attrac-
tive settlement offer-on these facts, an offer in the amount
of $30,000"--because settlement avoids my $10,000 cost of
going to trial8 7 If John's suit is frivolous, however, I should
refuse to settle. Of course, I could offer an amount some-
where between zero and $30,000, but that would be pointless.
Anything less than $30,000 is not attractive to legitimate
plaintiffs (who expect to do better than that at trial), so only
frivolous plaintiffs would accept. But frivolous plaintiffs drop
if I simply refuse to settle. So I should either offer $30,000 or
refuse to settle.
If I offer $30,000 all the time, all potential frivolous plain-
tiffs will sue. I could refuse to settle and try to deter frivolous
suits, but that is also costly. To succeed, I must refuse to settle
most, if not all, cases, and that means paying $10,000 for trial
every time a suit turns out to be legitimate.
What to do? Well, I know from experience how likely it is
that a fall, such as the one John alleges, is due to the fault of a
grocery store owner, so I can estimate the relative proportion
of potential frivolous and legitimate suits similar to John's. If
the proportion of potential frivolous suits is fairly small, then
it would be better for me to offer $30,000 all the time and set-
te with everyone. To be sure, this strategy will attract all the
frivolous plaintiffs, but there aren't that many, so I will end up
buying off a frivolous plaintiff only once in a long while. But
since there are lots of legitimate suits, offering a settlement
that would be accepted by a legitimate plaintiff will save a
great deal on trial costs. On balance, I gain much more by
paying off a few frivolous plaintiffs and saving trial costs in
86 In this hypothetical, John, a rational actor with a legitimate suit, calculates an
expected value of $30,000 from going to trial: 80% (chance of success) x $50,000
(award) - $10,000 (cost) = $30,000. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text
(defining expected value). Therefore, John will settle for $30,000 (or more), but will
reject any offer for less.
87 In fact, Mary expects to lose an additional $20,000 by going to trial instead of
settling a legitimate suit-although this is not important to the narrative. If Mary goes
to trial, she spends $10,000 and faces an 80% chance of paying a $50,000 award.
Therefore, her expected loss is $10,000 (cost) + 80% (chance of loss) x $50,000
(liability) = $50,000. This is $20,000 more than the $30,000 settlement.
MODELING FRIVOLOUS SUITS
many legitimate suits.
On the other hand, if the proportion of potential
frivolous suits is large, it wouldn't be a good idea for me to
settle with all plaintiffs. Doing so would attract too many
frivolous suits. So I am better off in this situation by refusing
to settle at least some of the time to deter frivolous filings. Of
course, I could refuse to settle all the time, but that is costly
when a suit turns out to be legitimate.8s Perhaps there is a
happy medium here-I could refuse to settle some of the
time to deter many of the frivolous plaintiffs, but not so much
of the time that I end up paying a lot for trials.
This narrative captures the essential intuition: 9 Plaintiffs with
frivolous suits try to take advantage of a defendant's ignorance by
filing in the hope that the defendant will believe that the suit is le-
gitimate and make the same offer she would make to a legitimate
plaintiff. Defendants know this about frivolous plaintiffs and so are
inclined to discourage frivolous filings by refusing to settle. The
problem is that refusing to settle can be costly for the defendant if the
suit turns out to be legitimate. In the end, what the parties actually
do depends on their beliefs about the proportion of potential frivo-
lous suits, since the costs and benefits of alternative strategies depend
on those beliefs.
John has the same information as Mary and is a rational maxi-
mizer like Mary, so John can perfectly anticipate what Mary will do,
and vice versa. Thus, John predicts that Mary always offers $30,000
when the proportion of potential frivolous suits is relatively small So John
and all plaintiffs like John sue,just as Mary predicted they would.
In game theory, this result is known as an "equilibrium.' 90 The
s More precisely and somewhat more technically, if defendants like Mary never
settle, then only legitimate plaintiffs will sue. In that case, defendants do better by
switching to $30,000 offers in all cases. If this occurs, however, all frivolous plaintiffs
would sue, and defendants would do better switching again. In other words, refusing
to settle all the time is not a stable strategy because it induces too strong a response
from frivolous plaintiffs.
89 The reader familiar with game theory will notice that the final paragraph of the
narrative glosses over some of the complexity of mixed strategies in order to convey
the intuition. See infra note 93 (defining mixed strategies). A mixed strategy is diffi-
cult to present intuitively in the context of a single game; it is much easier to under-
stand as a statistical prediction of behavior over a large number of identical games. See
infra note 94 (describing the statistical interpretation).
9D RASMUSEN, supra note 18, at 14-28. Technically, this is called a "Perfect Bayesian
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idea of an equilibrium follows from the special complexity of strategic
analysis. Strategic thinking involves a process of moving back and
forth between the parties-asking first how one party (A) might act,
then checking how the other (B) would respond, and then checking
again that A would still act in the specified way if he anticipated B's
response. John in our narrative decides what strategy to employ by
anticipating Mary's response, but Mary's response depends on what
John decides to do. In an equilibrium, each party acts in precisely the
way the other party anticipates, so neither has an incentive to deviate
and both do the best they can by following their prescribed strategy.
For example, given a small enough proportion of potential frivo-
lous suits,' Mary does the best she can by always offering $30,000
when she believes frivolous plaintiffs like John always file, and John does the
best he can by filing when he believes that defendants like Mary always offer
$30,000. Thus, an equilibrium has a self-reinforcing quality. When
the parties follow their equilibrium strategies, their beliefs are con-
firmed by their experience, so they have no reason to switch to a dif-
ferent strategy. If all parties in similar cases act as John and Mary do,
then Mary will come to believe that frivolous plaintiffs like John al-
ways file since that is what they actually do-and so too for John's be-
lief about defendants like Mary.
The simple narrative also reveals a second equilibrium, which
holds when the proportion of potential frivolous suits is relatively large. 9 2 In
these cases, plaintiffs like John predict that defendants like Mary will
refuse to settle much of the time-so frequently in fact that plaintiffs
file only some of the time.9 As this description suggests, the best way
to interpret this second equilibrium is to focus not on John and Mary,
but on all potential frivolous plaintiffs like John and all defendants
like Mary. Viewed in this way, the predictions furnish statistical in-
formation: they tell us how often frivolous plaintiffs in general sue
Equilibrium." Id. at 145-52.
91 It can be shown using technical reasoning that this equilibrium holds whenever
the 9.roportion of potential frivolous suits is less than 40%. SeeAppendix, IV.A.
" It can be shown that this second equilibrium holds whenever the proportion of
potential frivolous suits exceeds 40%. SeeAppendix, IV.A.
93 In game theory, John and Mary are said to adopt "mixed strategies." See
RASMUSEN, supra note 18, at 67-83. The name comes from the fact that the parties
"mix" between their possible strategies. See id at 68. In our hypothetical, defendants
like Mary mix by offering $30,000 some of the time and nothing the rest of the time,
and plaintiffs like John mix by suing some of the time and not suing the rest of the
time.
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and how frequently frivolous and legitimate suits end in settlement. 94
2. The Formal Model and Its Predictions
The abstract version of the informed-plaintiff model tracks our
simple narrative. There are only two types of suit, frivolous and le-
gitimate, and the plaintiff knows which type she has while the defen-
dant does not. The model assumes that frivolous suits always lose at
trial, and that legitimate suits all have the same chance of success on
average. Moreover, the model also assumes that defendants and
plaintiffs can estimate from experience the fraction of potential frivo-
lous and legitimate suits; that is, the fraction of all persons who could
file a frivolous suit and the fraction who could file a legitimate suit. 95
In the simple hypothetical, for example, we assumed John and Mary
(with their attorneys) had enough experience with slip-and-fall cases
to be able to estimate the likelihood that a slip-and-fall accident such
as the one John alleged was due to grocer negligence.96
94 See id., at 70-71. For example, suppose that the proportion of potential frivolous
suits is 50%. With a technical analysis, one can show that frivolous plaintiffs sue about
67% of the time and receive settlements (of $30,000) about 3% of the time, and that
legitimate suits settle about 3% of the time and go to trial about 97% of the time. See
Appendix, IV.A. The statistical interpretation avoids a source of awkwardness in apply-
ing mixed strategies to a single game; namely, that they seem to require players to flip
coins or run random number generators. See John Harsanyi, Games with Randomly Dis-
turbed Payoffs: A Ner Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points, 2 INT'L J. GAME
THEORY 1 (1973) (showing how mixed strategies can make sense in a single game
when there is uncertainty about payoffs). Yet, it is important to understand that this
interpretation does not require plaintiffs (or defendants) to cooperate or coordinate
in any way. The idea is not that all frivolous plaintiffs get together and decide how
often to file. Quite the contrary. Each plaintiff (and each defendant) acts separately
to maximize his or her own private return. Because the environment is highly interac-
tive, however, the optimal choice for any one person depends on what everyone else
does. For example, if frivolous plaintiffs were ever to file with a frequency greater than
the equilibrium rate of 67%, some defendants would eventually observe the change
and realize that they would do better by refusing to settle all the time. Gradually, the
proportion of settlements would fall below the equilibrium rate of 3%, and some frivo-
lous plaintiffs, observing the decline, would realize that they do better by never filing.
As a result, the filing rate would gradually fall, eventually returning to the equilibrium
rate of 67%. The same dynamic works in the opposite direction: deviations by defen-
dants from the equilibrium rate of offers will be dampened by plaintiffs' responses and
forced back toward the equilibrium in the long run. See Katz, supra note 17, at 12
(noting that his equilibria are stable under just such a dynamic adjustment process).
Therefore, like the invisible hand of the market, the interactive nature of the litigation
environment makes the equilibrium a good statistical approximation of average
behavior over the long run.
95 This is a standard modeling assumption. See RASMUSEN, supra note 18, at 48-56.
96 It is worth mentioning a somewhat technical point here. Theoretically at least,
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The sequence of events in the formal model, which tracks those
in the John and Mary hypothetical, can be diagrammed on the follow-
ing timeline:
Defendant Plaintiff Plaintiff
Sue Offers Accepts/Rejects Drop/Litigates Trial
First, a potential plaintiff with a frivolous suit decides whether or
not to file. (The model assumes that legitimate plaintiffs always file.)
If a potential plaintiff files, the defendant next must decide whether
to offer a settlement and in what amount. If the defendant offers a
settlement, the plaintiff decides whether to accept. If no offer is
made or if the plaintiff rejects, then the plaintiff decides whether to
drop or go to trial.
For simplicity, the model assumes that there is only one chance to
settle and that the parties cannot bargain over the settlement amount.
Thus, the offer is take-it-or-leave-it, and the case goes to trial if the
plaintiff rejects and does not drop. The model also assumes, again
for the sake of simplicity, that the defendant's task of choosing and
communicating an offer and the plaintiffs task of responding are
costless.
The model predicts two different equilibria, paralleling those in
the John and Mary hypothetical. In the first, the proportion of poten-
tial frivolous suits is low enough that defendants find it worthwhile to
offer all plaintiffs the amount that a legitimate plaintiff would accept
(i.e., the expected trial award from a legitimate suit net of litigation
costs), and accordingly, all frivolous plaintiffs file. 7 Because all suits
settle in this equilibrium, little in the way of litigation costs is wasted.
However, there is a potentially serious problem of unjustified wealth
transfers. The problem is much more serious than in the complete
anyone could file a frivolous suit, even someone totally unconnected to the transac-
tion or event. Obviously, this cannot define the universe of potential plaintiffs, for
then the fraction of potential frivolous plaintiffs would always be close to 100%. The
key to limiting the universe is to remember that party expectations control choice of
strategy. Clearly, no reasonable person would ever expect all the world to sue. In-
deed, parties are likely to limit the universe of potential plaintiffs to those persons hav-
ing some reasonable connection to the transaction or event and otherwise fitting the
general profile of the case.
97 See Katz, supra note 17, at 10-12 (referring to this equilibrium as the "restricted
entry equilibrium"). For a mathematically precise specification, see Appendix, II.A.
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information model because settlements are much larger.9 Moreover,
the problem gets worse as the expected trial award in a legitimate
suitr increases. This is because an unjustified wealth transfer occurs
each time a frivolous plaintiff obtains the settlement intended for a
legitimate suit, and the amount of such a settlement increases with
the expected trial award.
In the second equilibrium, the proportion of potential frivolous
suits is large enough that defendants are not willing to settle with all
plaintiffs. Instead, defendants, like Mary, make the offer that a le-
gitimate plaintiff would accept some, but not all, of the time, and
frivolous plaintiffs, like John, sue some, but not all, of the time.'00
The most serious problem in this second equilibrium turns out to be
wasted litigation costs, not unjustified wealth transfers. This is be-
cause defendants refuse to settle most of the time, so few frivolous
suits are rewarded while many legitimate suits go to trial.' ' Moreover,
it is also possible to show, with some technical analysis, that the prob-
lem gets worse as the expected trial award in a legitimate suit in-
102creases.
These predictions suggest that some form of regulation might be
desirable to deter frivolous filings in those litigation settings where a
plaintiff is likely to have critical private information. Moreover, al-
though each equilibrium is associated with a different kind of prob-
lem-unjustified wealth transfers in one, and wasted litigation costs in
98 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (arguing that complete informa-
tion settlements will be small on average).
The "expected trial award" is the probability of success times the anticipated
award without deduction for costs. For example, in the John and Mary hypothetical,
the expected trial award is $40,000 (i.e., 80% x $50,000).
1o See Katz, supra note 17, at 12-13 (referring to this equilibrium as the
"competitive equilibrium"). For a mathematically precise specification, see Appendix,
II.B.
101 See supra note 94 (noting that when the proportion of potential frivolous suits is
50%, only 3% of frivolous plaintiffs receive settlements in equilibrium, but 97% of le-
gitimate suits go to trial). For a mathematically precise specification, see Appendix,
II.B.
102 To illustrate, consider what happens in theJohn and Mary hypothetical, assum-
ing the fraction of potential frivolous suits is 50%, when the expected trial award in a
legitimate suit is raised from $40,000 (80% x $50,000) to $80,000 (80% x $100,000).
When the trial award is $40,000, it can be shown that parties spend on average a total
of $10,000 per suit. See Katz, supra note 17, at 16. When the trial award is $80,000,
however, parties are likely to spend more on the litigation because the stakes are
higher. See POSNER, supra note 42, at 525, 532-33. If expenditures increase propor-
tionately with the expected award, for example, total litigation costs will equal $20,000
per suit when the expected award is $80,000.
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the other-both problems become more severe as the average ex-
pected trial award in legitimate suits increases. This suggests that liti-
gation settings with high trial awards should have a priority claim on
scarce regulatory resources.
B. The Informed-Defendant Model
Sometimes it is the defendant rather than the plaintiff who knows
that a suit is meritless. In this situation, if the plaintiff does not inves-
tigate before filing, when he should, and files a meritless suit, the result-
ing litigation is frivolous within the second prong of my definition.
Examples include medical malpractice suits in which the patient has
no direct knowledge of what the doctor did; antitrust and civil rights
suits that depend on the defendant's intent, motivation or similar
state of mind; and securities fraud class actions that are only thinly in-
vestigated in the rush to be the first to file. °3
The informed-defendant model analyzes this situation. This
model is a bit more complicated than the informed-plaintiff model
because of the investigation option. However, the intuition is readily
conveyed by a hypothetical and simple narrative based on a medical
malpractice case.
1. A Simple Narrative: Paul v. Susan
Susan, a surgeon at a major hospital, operated on Paul. A year
after the operation, Paul suffers from occasional, mild dizzy spells.
Hospital doctors cannot identify the cause but insist that it has noth-
ing to do with the operation. Paul, who was anesthetized, has no idea
what actually happened during the operation.
Paul consults an attorney who specializes in medical malpractice
cases. Susan, of course, has access to hospital legal counsel, who are
also very experienced with malpractice cases. As in the John and
Mary hypothetical, assume here that the average meritorious case fac-
103 See, e.g., Lorentzen v. Anderson Pest Control, 64 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 1995)
(products liability); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986) (civil
rights); Blancato v. Saint Mary Hosp., No. CIV.A.91-4114, 1993 WL 273687 (E.D. Pa.
July 21, 1993) (medical malpractice); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 513-14, 577 (1991)
(securities class actions). Indeed, Congress recently enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act mainly in response to perceptions of a serious frivolous suit
problem in the securities field. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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tually similar to Paul's has an 80% chance of success at trial and re-
ceives a jury award of $50,000; that a meritless case never wins at trial,
and that all lawsuits, meritorious and meritless alike, cost $1000 to file
and $10,000 per side to litigate through trial. Assume further that the
$10,000 cost is split evenly between discovery and trial, so that $5,000
is spent at each stage. Assume also that discovery always reveals
whether suit is meritless and that Paul and Susan estimate that 50% of
all potential suits10 4 are meritless (that is, 50% of the time symptoms
like Paul's are not caused by surgical error).
Imagine how Paul and Susan (together with their attorneys)
might reflect on their options. I use the labels "meritorious" and
"meritless" rather than "legitimate" and "frivolous," throughout the
following discussion in order not to beg the question of when prefil-
ing investigation is reasonable.'05
Paul reflects: I would certainly like to know whether my
case is meritorious. I know from experience that many of
these kinds of cases have real merit. I could investigate, but
that would cost me a lot of time and money. That's a pity be-
cause Susan already knows the facts. Of course, she insists
there is no problem, but I can't trust her because she would
say the same thing even if there was. How can I bring her
knowledge to light in a reliable way? Suppose I don't investi-
gate, but simply file suit. If I have a good case, it will be in
Susan's interest to make me a good settlement offer. Thus,
Susan's offer could tell me whether I have a good case. So I
think I'll just wait to see what Susan does.
Susan reflects (assuming Paul's suit is meritless): I know Paul's
suit is meritless, and I want him to know as well. I have tried
to tell him numerous times, but of course he doesn't believe
me. I could just refuse to settle, 'Oand maybe that would per-
suade him and he would drop. To do that in a credible way,
104 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing this assumption).
105 A meritless suit is always frivolous in the informed-plaintiff model, since plain-
tiff knows the suit lacks merit. But here a meritless suit is frivolous only if plaintiff
should have investigated, and we do not yet know when that duty should attach.
106 Of course, Susan could make a very low "nuisance suit" offer in a meritless case,
as the complete information models predict. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying
text. I simplify, however, and assume defendants refuse to settle meritless cases. Al-
lowing for a nuisance settlement does not change the basic results as long as the set-
tlement is not too large.
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however, I have to refuse to settle all meritless cases. But then
I will be informing meritorious plaintiffs that their suits have
value, and they will hold out for large settlements. Indeed, if
I know that plaintiffs don't investigate and rely on a refusal to
settle as a sign that a suit lacks merit, I should always refuse to
settle, because that would trick meritorious plaintiffs into be-
lieving that their suit lacks merit too. But the problem is that
plaintiffs would eventually learn what I was doing and investi-
gate, thereby undermining my strategy and forcing me to
spend for discovery and trial.
This simple narrative captures the intuition: Plaintiffs like Paul
want to identify the kind of suit they have, and they want to do so in
the least expensive way. They have three alternatives: they can find
out themselves by investigating before filing; they can file and hope
that defendants like Mary tell them by making different offers in
meritorious and meritless suits; or they can file and go through dis-
covery. Each option is costly, and plaintiffs compare the costs when
determining their optimal strategy.
Defendants have opposing incentives. Defendants want plaintiffs
to know the truth when their suit is meritless, but not when their suit
is meritorious. Thus, defendants in meritorious cases try to deceive
plaintiffs by pooling, that is, by making the same offer they would
make if the suit was meritless. The problem is that plaintiffs eventu-
ally learn that they are being tricked, and they respond by relying less
on the defendant's offer and more on investigation or discovery
(whichever is cheaper). Defendants, in turn, worry more about pay-
ing for discovery and trial in meritorious cases and so they pool less
frequently and make an attractive offer more frequently.
In game theory, this is known as a "signaling game" because a de-
fendant's settlement offer can "signal" a plaintiff as to the kind of suit
he has. 1 7 The signaling game between Paul and Susan has three pos-
sible equilibria, depending on the cost of investigation. I illustrate
these different equilibria with the following three simple scenarios.
In each, Paul asks himself whether to investigate before filing,
whether to file, and how to respond to a settlement offer if one is
made-all without knowing whether his case has merit. Susan asks
herself whether to offer a settlement and in what amount. Unlike
107 See generally RASMUSEN, supra note 18, at 249-68 (discussing signaling games).
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Paul, however, she knows whether the suit is meritorious, but cannot
observe directly whether Paul has investigated.
a. Scenario #1-Investigation Costs $100
Suppose that Paul can rule out the possibility that his suit is merit-
less by consulting a specialist at a cost of $100, and suppose that Paul
and Susan both know this fact. Assume, for instance, that the special-
ist can tell by examining Paul and his health history whether negli-
gent surgery could possibly have caused his dizziness. The parties re-
flect as follows:
Paul reflects: By spending relatively little ($100), I can de-
termine whether my case has merit and save the $1000 filing
cost if it turns out to be meritless. What are my other options?
I could just file and hope that I learn from Susan's offer. But
then I would waste the $1000 filing cost if the suit turns out to
be meritless. I know that 50% of all cases like mine are merit-
less, so I can expect to incur this $1000 cost 50% of the time,
for a real (expected) cost to me of $500. Because investiga-
tion costs only $100, I clearly do better by investigating. My
other option, discovery, is even more expensive, so I better
consult the specialist.
Susan reflects: It's very cheap for Paul to investigate. In
fact, it's so cheap that I know he will do so even if he expects
me to signal him perfectly by offering $30,000 in a meritori-
ous case and refusing to settle a meritless case. Therefore, I
can assume Paul is informed. It follows that I should refuse to
settle when the suit is meritless, because then an informed
Paul will drop his suit. And I should offer $30,000 when suit
is meritorious, because then Paul will accept, saving me the
$10,000 cost of discovery and trial.
The Equilibrium Prediction. Therefore, we have the following gen-
eral prediction: If 50% of all potential suits are meritless and the cost
of investigating is $100, then all plaintiffs will investigate before filing
and file only meritorious suits, and all meritorious suits will settle for
$30,000.108 This result is not at all surprising given the very low cost of
108 In other words, defendants like Susan do the best they can by offering $30,000
in meritorious cases and nothing in meritless cases when they expect plaintiffs like Paul
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investigation. Indeed, we know that the equilibrium holds whenever
the investigation cost is less than $500 on these facts (and more gen-
erally, whenever the investigation cost is less than the expected cost of
filing a meritless suit).
b. Scenario #2-Investigation Costs $5000
Suppose now that it is very difficult for Paul to tell whether negli-
gent surgery could possibly have caused his dizziness, so difficult in
fact that Paul would have to spend $5000 to investigate. At the ex-
treme, perhaps Paul may have to bribe hospital personnel to divulge
confidential records or tell him what they saw or heard during the
surgery. On this new assumption, the parties reflect as follows:
Paul reflects: Investigation is pretty expensive here, though
it would save me the cost of filing and possibly also litigating a
meritless suit through discovery. What if I just file instead?
The worst that could happen is that I would litigate all the way
through discovery and then find out that the suit is meritless.
This wastes $6000 in filing and discovery costs, but only if my
suit turns out to be meritless, which happens 50% of the time.
As a result, the real (expected) cost to me is $3000 (50% of
$6000), and this is less than the $5000 I must spend to inves-
tigate. So I am better off filing without investigating and
seeing what Susan does.
Susan reflects (assuming Paul's case is meritorious): Investiga-
tion is so costly that Paul will never investigate, so I'm dealing
with an uninformed plaintiff. I could therefore refuse to set-
tle. That would be a good idea if it tricks Paul into believing
the suit is meritless and he drops. But it would be a bad idea
if Paul decides to find out what kind of suit he has by litigat-
ing. In that case, I would have to pay $10,000 for discovery
and trial, an extra expense that I could have avoided by set-
tling. Of course, I could just offer $30,000. But that would be
a pity if the uninformed Paul would have dropped if I had re-
fused to settle. My third alternative is to offer an amount be-
tween zero and $30,000. But that makes no sense at all. Paul
always to investigate and plaintiffs like Paul do the best they can by always investigating
when they expect defendants like Susan to make the two different moves (offer $30, 000 or refuse to
settle) depending on the merits of the case
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expects defendants in meritless suits to refuse to settle,'09 so
he will read an offer greater than zero as a sign that the suit is
meritorious and will reject it if the offer is less than $30,000
(what he expects to get by going to trial).
What to do? If I refuse to settle, I risk paying for trial un-
necessarily, but if I offer $30,000, I miss an opportunity to
trick an uninformed plaintiff. I wish I knew what Paul would
do. If I could be sure that he would drop, I should refuse to
settle. But if Paul expects defendants like me to do this in all
meritorious cases, he will litigate further to find out what kind
of suit he has, and I will end up paying for trial."0 If I could
be sure Paul would litigate, then I should offer $30,000. But if
Paul expects this, then he would interpret a refusal to settle as
a sign that the suit is meritless and drop. But then I would do
better by refusing to settle.
Therefore, neither of my two alternatives is clearly opti-
mal given my uncertainty about Paul. Perhaps there is a
happy medium. I could offer $30,000 sometimes and refuse
to settle the rest of the time. This strategy would save a little
on discovery and trial and also allow me to benefit somewhat
from plaintiffs ignorance. And if plaintiffs like Paul expect
this strategy, they are likely to respond to a refusal to settle by
litigating sometimes and dropping sometimes. By dropping
sometimes, plaintiffs like Paul save some of the wasted costs of
conducting discovery in a meritless suit, and by litigating
sometimes, they reap some of the benefits when the suit turns
out to be meritorious.
The Equilibrium Prediction. Therefore, we have the following gen-
eral prediction: If 50% of all potential suits are meritless and the cost
of investigating is $5000, plaintiffs will never investigate; all plaintiffs
will sue; defendants will offer $30,000 some of the time and refuse to
settle the rest of the time when the suit is meritorious, and will always
refuse to settle when suit is meritless; and plaintiffs will drop their
suits some of the time and litigate the rest of the time whenever de-
109 For the intuition supporting this belief, see infra note 122.
110 On our factual assumptions, plaintiffs like Paul always litigate when defendants
pool completely. The reason is that plaintiffs learn nothing from the offer and calcu-
late a positive expected value of litigating (having already sunk the filing cost) equal to
0.5 x $30,000 - 0.5 x $5000 = $12,500.
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fendant refuses to settle."' As a result, all meritless suits will be filed,
some meritless suits will proceed through discovery, some meritorious
suits will settle for $30,000, some meritorious suits will be dropped,
and the remainder of the meritorious suits will go to trial.' This
equilibrium holds whenever investigation costs exceed $3000 (or
more generally, exceed the expected cost of filing and discovery in a
meritless suit)."s
c. Scenario #3-Investigation Costs $2000
Finally, consider what happens when the cost of an investigation
is moderate. Assume, for instance, that Paul can find out whether his
suit is meritless by spending $2000.
Paul reflects: I could investigate. But if I do that and Susan
expects it, then I know that she will offer $30,000 if my suit is
meritorious and refuse to settle if my suit is meritless [like
Scenario #1]. Therefore, I will learn from her offer what kind
of suit I have. In that case, I do better by filing without inves-
tigating. With 50% potential meritless suits, filing costs me
Il This equilibrium involves mixed strategies and the reader versed in game
theory will notice that the final paragraph of the narrative glosses over the technical
difficulties in order to convey the intuition. For more on mixed strategies, see supra
notes 93-94 and accompanying text (explaining how mixed strategies make sense in
the absence of cooperation or coordination).
112 In fact, as we saw was true for the informed-plaintiff model, see supra note 94, it
is possible to predict the equilibrium rates at which defendants offer $30,000 and
plaintiffs drop. Again the technical details are beyond the scope of this Article, but it
can be shown that defendants like Susan will make the $30,000 offer about 83% of the
time in meritorious suits, and plaintiffs like Paul will drop 40% of the time in response
to a refusal to settle. See Appendix, III.D.2 (giving the general formulae), IV.B.2
(calculating the results for this hypothetical). As a result, 83% of all meritorious suits
settle for $30,000, about 7% are dropped, and about 10% are litigated through trial.
Moreover, all meritless suits are filed and 60% go through discovery.
,,s In game theory, this is known as a "partial pooling equilibrium" because defen-
dants in meritorious suits sometimes "pool" with defendants in meritless suits by also
refusing to settle. (In contrast, the equilibrium in Scenario #1 is known as a
"separating equilibrium.") See RASMUSEN, supra note 18, at 148-50. This partial pool-
ing equilibrium has a self-reinforcing quality. For example, using the rates in note
112, supra, if defendants were to pool more often than 17% of the time, some plaintiffs
would eventually observe the deviation and realize that it was better to litigate than
drop. Gradually, the litigation rate would rise above 60%, and some defendants, ob-
serving this increase, would realize that it was better to separate than pool. As a result,
the pooling rate would gradually fall, eventually returning to the equilibrium rate of
17%.
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$500 in expected loss [from Scenario #1], and that's a lot less
than $2000 for an investigation. So, if Susan expects me to
investigate, I do better by not investigating. But she knows
what I know and can figure that out, so I won't be able to trick
her.
I could just file without investigating. But if Susan expects
this, she will try to trick me by refusing to settle a meritorious
case, and I will have to litigate sometimes in order to learn my
suit type at the discovery stage [just as I did in Scenario #2].
But it never makes sense to use discovery to learn suit type;
investigating is less expensive. I know [from Scenario #2] that
discovery costs $3000 in expected loss, more than the $2000
for investigating. So, if Susan expects me to file without inves-
tigating, I do better investigating. Again, however, Susan can
figure that out, so I cannot trick her this way either.
What to do? Neither of my two alternatives is optimal.
Simply put, always investigating wastes an opportunity to learn
from Susan's offer, and always just filing (without investigat-
ing) wastes money on discovery if the suit turns out to be
meriless. Perhaps there is a happy medium for plaintiffs like114
me 1-we could investigate only sometimes and drop in re-
sponse to a refusal to settle whenever we don't investigate.
This way, we learn something from the settlement offer and
avoid the cost of using discovery to find out the suit type.
Susan reflects (assuming Paul's suit is meritorious): I believe
plaintiffs like Paul investigate sometimes, but I don't know
whether Paul has investigated in this case. I could just refuse
to settle. That might trick Paul if he has not investigated, but
it will cost me $10,000 for trial if he has investigated. I could
offer $30,000 instead. That would be a good idea if Paul has
investigated, since I save trial costs that way. But it would be a
pity to offer $30,000 if Paul has not investigated. Therefore,
neither alternative is optimal. I could offer something be-
tween zero and $30,000, but that makes no sense. Paul knows
114 If Paul is a one-shot litigant, it may seem odd to express his decision in terms of
a random choice between two options. This reflects the problem with describing
mixed strategies in a single game. See supra note 89. The switch from the singular "I"
to the plural "we" is meant to express the result in terms of a statistical prediction over
the entire class of plaintiffs, which is exactly the way Susan would look at it. See supra
notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing mixed strategies and showing how to
interpret them in a noncooperative game).
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that defendants like me always refuse to settle meritless suits,
so he will interpret an offer greater than zero as a sign that his
suit is meritorious and reject my offer.
What to do? Perhaps there is a happy medium here. I
could offer $30,000 sometimes in meritorious cases and re-
fuse to settle the rest of the time. When I refuse to settle,
plaintiffs like Paul will drop if they have not investigated, so I
get some of the benefit of pooling. Moreover, when I offer
$30,000, I get some of the benefit of avoiding a trial against
an informed plaintiff.
The Equilibrium Prediction. Therefore, we have the following gen-
eral prediction: If 50% of all potential suits are meritless and investi-
gation costs $2000, there is a partial pooling equilibrium in which
plaintiffs investigate sometimes but not always; plaintiffs sue when
they investigate and the suit turns out to be meritorious, and also sue
when they do not investigate; defendants in meritorious suits offer
$30,000 some of the time and refuse to settle the rest of the time; de-
fendants in meritless suits always refuse to settle; and uninformed
plaintiffs always drop when defendants refuse to settle. This equilib-
rium holds on these facts whenever the investigation cost is between
$500 and $3000 (or more generally, when the investigation cost is be-
tween the expected cost of filing a meritless suit and the expected
cost of filing and conducting discovery in a meritless suit). In this
equilibrium, some but not all meritless suits are filed. Moreover,
some meritorious suits settle for $30,000, some are dropped, and the
rest go to trial (but no meritless suits ever go through discovery).s5
115 It is possible to predict the equilibrium rates of investigation and $30,000
offers. The analysis is technically complex, but it shows that plaintiffs like Paul investi-
gate 60% of the time and defendants like Susan make the $30,000 offer in 90% of the
meritorious cases. See Appendix, III.D.3. (giving the general formulae), IV.B.3
(calculating the results for this hypothetical). Changing the facts produces even more
serious results. For example, suppose that the average meritorious case has a 60%
chance of success;juries award $200,000 on average; filing costs $1000; discovery costs
$19,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants; trial costs $20,000 for both parties,
and 60% of all potential suits are meritless. On these new facts, and assuming that a
prefiling investigation costs $11,000, it can be shown that plaintiffs will investigate
about'50% of the time and defendants will make an attractive settlement offer (here
in the amount of $81,000) about 68% of the time. SeeAppendix, IV.B.4.a. The result
is that roughly 50% of all meritless suits are filed; 16% of all meritorious suits go to
trial, and 16% of all meritorious suits are dropped (because plaintiffs are unin-
formed). Thus, roughly one-third of all meritorious suits end in a problematic out-
come-either they go to trial or they are dropped-entirely due to the presence of
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2. The Formal Model and Its Predictions
The formal model tracks the structure of the Paul and Susan hy-
pothetical. Many of its assumptions are the same as those in the in-
formed-plaintiff model. For example, there are only two types of suit
(meritorious and meritless); meritless suits always lose at trial; all
meritorious suits have the same probability of success; plaintiffs and
defendants know the background proportion of potential meritless
suits; settlement negotiations are costless; there is only one opportu-
nity to settle; and all settlement offers are made on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis."r' However, the information structure is reversed: the defen-
dant always knows whether the suit is meritless, but the plaintiff only
knows if he investigates.
The sequence of events can be diagrammed on the following
timeline:
Plaintiff Plaintiff Plaintiff
Investi- Defendant Accepts/ Drops/ Discov- Drops/
gate Sue Offers Rejects Litiees cry Litifates Trial
I I 1 1i-4
In the first stage, plaintiffs like Paul decide whether or not to in-
vestigate. Investigation is costly, but it also reveals information about
whether a suit is meritless. For simplicity, the model assumes that in-
vestigation perfectly reveals the type of case and saves nothing on
costs later in the litigation.
Whether or not he investigates, plaintiff must next decide
whether to sue. I assume that plaintiffs sue when they know their suit
is meritorious (otherwise no suits would ever be filed), and also when
they are uncertain because they have not investigated. 1 7 If the plain-
tiff sues, the defendant next decides whether to make a settlement
offer and for what amount, knowing the kind of case but not knowing
meritless suits.
116 In addition, the plaintiff and the defendant are both assumed to be risk-
neutral, as in the informed-plaintiff model. They both have access to the same infor-
mation and thus agree on the probability of success, likely trial award, cost of filing,
and cost of discovery and trial for each side.
117 This assumption in effect eliminates the less interesting equilibria set out in
Appendix, III.A. Simply stated, if plaintiffs never sue when they are uninformed, then
either they investigate and file only meritorious suits, or if an investigation costs too
much, they never sue.
1997]
560 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 145:519
whether plaintiff knows." 8 If the defendant makes an offer, the plain-
tiff must decide whether to accept or reject. If the plaintiff accepts,
the parties settle for that amount. If the plaintiff rejects or if the de-
fendant refuses to settle, the plaintiff has a chance to drop the suit. If
the plaintiff does not drop, he takes the case through discovery.
During discovery, the plaintiff learns whether his suit is meritless if he
does not know already, and he gets another chance to drop after dis-
covery. If plaintiff does not drop at this point, the case is tried.
Although this model is somewhat more complicated than the in-
formed-plaintiff model, the Paul and Susan narrative illustrates the
basic intuition and strategic dynamics. The fundamental result is that
rational plaintiffs sometimes file meritless suits without investigating,
even when they know that investigation at moderate cost perfectly re-
veals the suit type and that meritless suits have absolutely no chance
of winning at trial or eliciting a positive settlement offer from the de-
fendant. Equally important, the model shows why plaintiffs do not
investigate: they rely on obtaining information from defendant's set-
tlement offer.
More precisely, the informed-defendant model has three possible
equilibria that depend on the cost of investigation when all other pa-
rameters are fixed:
The Investigation Equilibrium. In the equilibrium that corresponds
to Scenario #1, investigation costs are very low-less than the ex-
pected cost of filing a merftless suit. Under these circumstances,
plaintiffs always investigate and file only meritorious suits. Anticipat-
ing this, defendants always make an offer that meritorious plaintiffs
accept. As a result, no meritless suits are filed and all meritorious
suits settle, so there are no wasted litigation costs, except the cost of
investigating, and no unjustified wealth transfers. I shall refer to this
equilibrium as the "investigation equilibrium."
The Filing Equilibrium. In the equilibrium corresponding to Sce-
nario #2, investigation costs are very high-greater than the expected
total filing and discovery cost in a meritless suit.' "' This might hold,
11 Thus, the model in fact has two-sided asymmetric information: the plaintiff
does not know whether his suit is meritless without doing an investigation, and the de-
fendant does not know whether plaintiff has investigated.
119 Technically, it is also necessary to assume that defendant's discovery cost is not
too large, or equivalently, that the fraction of potential meritless suits is not too high.
When defendant's discovery cost exceeds a certain threshold ($12,500 in the Paul and
Susan hypothetical, assuming 50% potential meritless suits), defendants in meritless
suits will make an offer that an uninformed plaintiff accepts. It turns out that defen-
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for example, in a civil rights suit that turns on conspiracy or state of
mind evidence that is difficult to obtain without formal discovery,120 or
in a medical malpractice case like the Paul and Susan hypothetical. 2'
Under these circumstances, it is less expensive for plaintiffs to learn
suit type by discovery, so they always sue without investigating. An-
ticipating this, defendants never settle meritless suits,'2 and exploit
plaintiffs' ignorance by sometimes refusing to settle meritorious suits.
Expecting this, plaintiffs sometimes litigate through discovery to learn
suit type, and defendants, concerned about the risk of paying for dis-
covery and trial in meritorious suits, sometimes make an offer attrac-
tive to a meritorious plaintiff.z2
I call this the "filing equilibrium" because plaintiffs always file and
never investigate. The presence of potential meritless suits has two
dants always offer this amount whether the suit is meritorious or meritless; plaintiffs
always accept, and all suits settle. The main problem is the large number of unjusti-
fied wealth transfers. For the precise characterization of this pure pooling equilib-
rium, see Appendix, III.C.2.
120 See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that it
would be unlikely for the plaintiff in a civil rights case to possess enough information
to support his allegations before formal discovery); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
No. 91 C 1475, 1994 WL 327381, at "10 (N.D. Ill.July 6, 1994) (mem.) (stating that dis-
covery was warranted to determine the merits of the discriminatory discharge claim).
See generally Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 485, 493-95,
497-98 (1989) (discussing the conflict between Rule 1l's prefiling investigation re-
quirement and the fact that information may not be available to a civil rights plaintiff
until discovery).
121 See, e.g., Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical
Examination of the Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. ECON. 199, 215-16 (1991) (discussing
the asymmetric information problem in medical malpractice suits).
This can be seen intuitively in the following way. Raising the settlement offer
has two opposite effects. On the one hand, it makes settlement more costly. On the
other, it increases the rate of acceptance, reducing the number of times defendant has
to pay for discovery. Pooling dilutes the second effect, however, so the first dominates.
Therefore, the defendant does best by refusing to settle when the suit is meritless. For
a rigorous proof, see Robert G. Bone, An Investigation Model of Frivolous Suits (1995)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
There is another, somewhat more technical, way to understand these strategic
dynamics. Recall that plaintiffs have three options to learn suit type: investigating,
signaling and relying on discovery. Here investigating is more expensive than discov-
ery, so plaintiffs eliminate that option at the outset. Plaintiffs could just rely on dis-
covery all the time, in which case they would always litigate in response to a refusal to
settle. This option, however, ignores the fact that signaling also provides information.
As plaintiffs increase their use of discovery to learn suit type, defendants pool less
often, so the pool includes fewer defendants in meritorious suits. Thus, a refusal to
settle sends a stronger signal of meritless litigation, and the stronger the signal, the
less worthwhile it is for plaintiffs to rely on discovery. Therefore, a plaintiff's optimal
strategy strikes a balance between discovery and signaling to minimize learning costs.
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adverse effects in this equilibrium. First, it creates wealth transfers
from plaintiffs to defendants by occasionally inducing plaintiffs with
meritorious suits to drop in response to a refusal to settle. Second, it
induces trials in meritorious suits that otherwise would have settled,
and it also forces filing, and sometimes even discovery, in meritless
suits.
124
These effects create two types of efficiency loss compared to the
situation when all plaintiffs investigate: they distort incentives and in-
crease total litigation costs. These results are difficult to demonstrate
intuitively, so I shall summarize them here and provide examples in
the footnotes. (The technical reader can confirm the analysis by
using the formulae in the Appendix.'25)
The adverse impact on incentives follows from the fact that de-
fendants end up paying more on balance because of higher litigation
costs, even though they save somewhat because of favorable wealth
transfers. The prospect of a larger loss can cause defendants to in-
vest more in precaution than they would if all plaintiffs investigated,
and the additional investment can produce a suboptimal allocation of
resources relative to an investigation equilibrium.
Furthermore, total litigation costs are greater in the filing equilib-
rium, provided that the cost of an investigation is not too high. This
is because the wasted cost of unnecessary trials as well as filing and
discovery in meritless suits exceeds the additional investigation cost
incurred when plaintiffs always investigate.2
7
124 This prediction is confirmed by one empirical study of medical malpractice liti-
gation that found that a substantial number of plaintiffs went through discovery,
learned their suit was meritless, and then dropped. See Farber & White, supra note
121, at 215-16 (hypothesizing that hospitals have information about liability that can
be credibly disclosed to plaintiff only through discovery). Furthermore, the lack of
investigation in the filing equilibrium might also help explain the results of another
empirical study that found an abnormally high frequency of refusals to settle by de-
fendants in medical malpractice suits. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting
to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Tria 90 MicH. L. REv.
319, 360-64 (1991) (explaining the phenomenon by the nature of insurance arrange-
ments).
125 See Appendix, III.D.2.
126 For example, in the Paul and Susan hypothetical, Susan's expected loss is
$16,500 per suit when no plaintiffs investigate and only $15,000 when all plaintiffs in-
vesti ate. SeeAppendix, III.D.l.b, D.2.b. (giving formulae for expected loss).
For example, consider the Paul and Susan hypothetical, but assume that inves-
tigation costs $4000. On these facts, total litigation costs are $5000 per suit, on aver-
age, when no plaintiffs investigate and $4500 per suit when all plaintiffs investigate.
To illustrate the necessity of the proviso that the cost of an investigation not be too
high, consider the results when investigation cost is $5000, as in the original hypo-
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Efficiency is not the only concern. Fairness is also relevant be-
cause wealth transfers can violate fairness norms. In the filing equi-
librium, when plaintiffs with meritorious suits drop, the resulting
transfer of wealth systematically deprives plaintiffs of their entitle-
ments. Plaintiffs can avoid the loss by investigating, but the cost is too
high to make an investigation rational."
The Mixed Equilibrium. In the equilibrium corresponding to Sce-
nario #3, investigation costs are moderate-greater than the expected
cost of filing a meritless suit, but less than the expected cost of taking
the suit through discovery. Many of the informed-defendant cases fit
this profile. In these cases, plaintiffs investigate sometimes, but not
always. Anticipating this, defendants always refuse to settle meritless
suits. Worried about paying trial costs when plaintiffs investigate,
however, defendants frequently make attractive settlement offers in
meritorious suits. At the same time, since plaintiffs do not always in-
vestigate, defendants know that they can gain from pooling, so they
refuse to settle meritorious suits some of the time. Furthermore, be-
cause investigation costs are moderate, plaintiffs always do better in-
vestigating when the alternative is to take a meritless case through
discovery, so they always drop when they have not investigated and
the defendant refuses to settle.'2" I shall refer to this situation as "the
mixed equilibrium" because plaintiffs mix between investigating and
simply filing.
The presence of meritless suits produces the same two effects as
in the filing equilibrium, although they are less serious because plain-
tiffs sometimes investigate. Meritless suits create unjustified wealth
transfers from plaintiffs to defendants whenever meritorious suits are
dropped and waste litigation costs by generating unnecessary trials in
meritorious suits and filing costs in meritless suits.
thetical. Then total litigation costs are lower when no plaintiff investigates: they drop
from $5500 per suit to $5000 per suit.
128 A complete fairness analysis must engage a tricky moral question: Is it ever
morally acceptable to impose a loss that would otherwise be unfair just because the
victim failed to take advantage of a feasible, though irrationa4 way of avoiding it?
12 9 An argument similar to the one in note 123, supra, can be developed. Here,
investigation is less expensive than discovery, so plaintiffs eliminate the discovery
option at the outset. Moreover, as plaintiffs investigate more frequently, defendants
pool less frequently, and the signaling value of a refusal to settle increases accordingly,
making investigation less worthwhile. The optimal strategy strikes a balance between
investigation and signaling to minimize plaintiffs' learning costs.
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3. Defining a "Reasonable" Prefiling Investigation
The analysis so far has bracketed the normative question of when
a failure to investigate is unreasonable and thus the filing of a lawsuit
"frivolous." We now have the necessary background to address this
question.
It is useful to divide the analysis into two stages, separating issues
of duty from issues of enforcement. In the first stage, discussed in
this section, I derive the ideal conditions for imposing a duty to inves-
tigate on the first-best assumption that compliance is perfect and cost-
less. In the second stage, discussed in Part VI, I relax the strong com-
pliance assumption to determine the best way to enforce the duty
given the costs of alternative enforcement schemes.
First, note that requiring investigation all the time is equivalent to
forcing the parties into an investigation equilibrium. Assuming per-
fect compliance, defendants will expect plaintiffs to be informed, and
therefore will make attractive offers in all meritorious suits and refuse
to settle meritless suits should any be filed. Anticipating this, plain-
tiffs will file only meritorious suits, and all such suits will settle.
Second, observe that the equilibrium analysis of the previous sec-
tion narrows the inquiry in a useful way. It focuses attention on the
filing and mixed equilibria, since plaintiffs already investigate in the
investigation equilibrium. More importantly, it frames a sensible ap-
proach to the inquiry. To evaluate the desirability of an investigation
requirement, we should examine the way the critical variables-total
litigation costs, plaintiff's expected recovery and defendant's ex-
pected loss-change when the investigation requirement forces the
parties to shift from a filing or mixed equilibrium to an investigation
equilibrium.
Equations derived from the formal equilibrium analysis permit
calculation of total litigation costs, expected recovery and expected
loss in each of the three different equilibria, all within the confines of
the formal model.'30 The results make a strong case for requiring in-
vestigation in the mixed equilibrium. The shift from a mixed equilib-
rium to an investigation equilibrium leaves private litigation costs
(including investigation costs) unchanged, but reduces public costs
by reducing the number of discovery and trial events. Moreover, the
shift does not change plaintiff's expected recovery or defendant's ex-
150 See Appendix, III.D (giving mathematical formulae for litigation costs [LC], the
plaintiff's expected recovery [EV], and the defendant's expected loss [EL]).
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pected loss, when both are measured prior to any injury or suit.
These results clearly support an investigation requirement on effi-
ciency grounds, since investigation reduces total costs without chang-
ing expectations and thus incentives. But what about rights-based or
fairness theories? Such theories are distinctive for their individual-
ized focus and therefore are not likely to be concerned with probabil-
istic expectations measured from a distant ex ante point of view.' Yet,
even on this more individualized metric, an investigation duty is justi-
fied in the mixed equilibrium. According to the model, defendants
never pay more than their substantive obligation in meritorious suits
and never pay anything in meritless suits-just as it should be. Fur-
thermore, plaintiffs in meritorious suits do better on average in the
investigation equilibrium, and their expected recovery comes closer
to their substantive entitlement.' 2
The analysis of the filing equilibrium-in which investigation cost
is so high that plaintiffs never investigate-is more ambiguous. One
thing is clear: it is never desirable to require investigation when the
cost of investigating is so high that a rational plaintiff would not sue if
he had to investigate beforehand. But what about requiring investiga-
tion short of this limit? The shift to an investigation equilibrium over
this range is desirable for its effect on defendants because it elimi-
nates a plaintiff's opportunity to impose strategic costs. It is also pos-
sible to show, with the formal analysis, that the shift will have a bene-
ficial effect on total litigation costs, at least when investigation is not
too expensive.
The impact on plaintiffs, however, is more ambiguous. The cost
of an investigation is high enough in the filing equilibrium that re-
13 For example, corrective justice theories focus on correcting wrongs to indi-
viduals and remedying invasions of an individual's rights. See Kenneth W. Simons, Cor-
rective Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 113, 125-26
(1990).
132 Technically, this result holds true only if the cost of an investigation exceeds
the cost of filing, which is likely in a mixed equilibrium. The argument is not that all
plaintiffs are better off in an investigation equilibrium. If that were true, the ex ante
expected value of suit would increase-but it does not. Instead, the argument is that
plaintiffs with meritorious suits do better in expected value terms by investigating all
the time. In a mixed equilibrium, plaintiffs who do not investigate get a free ride-
they benefit from attractive settlement offers made possible by the fact that other
plaintiffs take the trouble to investigate. Thus, although the argument is about aver-
age effects, it is still consistent with a fairness approach that focuses on individuals.
See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1191, 1215-16 (1994) (discussing how tradeoffs fit into fairness and rights-based
theories).
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quiring it all the time reduces the plaintiffs expected recovery.
Whether this is good or bad depends on one's view of what consti-
tutes ideal recovery. On efficiency grounds, the reduction in ex-
pected recovery is not likely to be so large that the costs associated
with distorted incentives, if any, would overwhelm the combination of
litigation cost savings and possible improvement in defendants' in-
centives. On fairness grounds, however, the ultimate judgment is un-
certain. It depends on who should bear the cost of investigating. If it
is fair (or at least not unfair) to impose that cost on plaintiffs, then an
investigation duty would be justified.
The important point is that the model unequivocally supports a
duty to investigate in the mixed equilibrium, where investigation costs
are moderate and a failure to investigate clearly unreasonable.
Therefore, I focus on this equilibrium in the remaining discussion.'3
While it is difficult to demonstrate intuitively,3 4 it turns out that effi-
ciency concerns become more serious in this equilibrium as the aver-
age expected trial award in a meritorious suit gets smaller.' 3 These
results suggest that scarce regulatory resources perhaps should be fo-
cused first on those litigation settings with a relatively low average ex-
pected trial award in meritorious suits.
C. Reliability of the Asymmetric Information Models
Before relying on the predictions of the two asymmetric informa-
133 At the same time, I recognize that it might also be desirable to address some
cases in the filing equilibrium.
134 The technical reader can verify the results by consulting the Appendix. See
Appendix, III.D.3.
The reason is that plaintiffs expect to make more from investigating as the ex-
pected trial award increases (since knowing a suit is meritorious then pays a higher
return). As a result, plaintiffs investigate more often, and the higher rate of investiga-
tion reduces the efficiency loss. To illustrate, consider what happens in the Paul and
Susan hypothetical when the expected trial award increases from $40,000 to $90,000.
See Appendix, IV.B.4.b (calculating the results for $90,000). At $40,000, plaintiffs in-
vestigate 60% of the time, and at $90,000, they investigate 80% of the time. Although
this increases total investigation costs, it also reduces the number of meritless filings
and the number of times a meritorious plaintiff goes to trial. It turns out that total
private litigation costs do not change (the opposing effects just cancel), but public liti-
gation costs decline (since the public cost of processing filings and conducting trials is
less when there are fewer frivolous filings and fewer trials). Therefore, total private
and public litigation costs are lower when the expected trial award is higher. The im-
pact on fairness concerns is more ambiguous, however. The frequency of unjustified
wealth transfers decreases from 4% to roughly 0.8%, but the amount of each transfer
increases from $30,000 to $80,000.
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don models, it is important to test their reliability. I do this in two
parts: first, I examine the internal assumptions of the two models,
and then I consider whether there are variables external to the mod-
els that might affect their predictions.
1. Internal Assumptions
The first thing to note is the assumption common to both models
that critical private information cannot be easily communicated to the
other side. This assumption is crucial to the informational asymme-
try, and it is probably realistic for most situations. In the informed-
plaintiff model, for example, frivolous as well as legitimate plaintiffs
will insist that their suits are legitimate, so defendants will have to dis-
count the value of any information they receive. 36 Similarly, in the
informed-defendant model, defendants have an incentive to claim
that the case is meritless whether or not it actually is, so information
will be discounted there as well.' 7
The models also implicitly assume that defendants will have diffi-
culty obtaining summary judgment (or dismissal) prior to discovery.
This assumption is plausible in the informed-plaintiff model, since
defendants do not know before discovery whether a suit is frivolous
and so do not know whether summary judgment is warranted. In the
informed-defendant model, on the other hand, the defendant knows
that the suit is meritless and thus has an incentive to seek summary
judgment at the earliest possible moment. Still, the assumption is re-
alistic here too because plaintiffs are often able to put off summary
judgment by filing affidavits attesting to the need for discovery.1
13 See Bebchuk, supra note 83, at 442 n.8 (arguing that plaintiffs cannot convince
defendants that their suits are meritorious without incurring high costs because the
defendant will automatically discount the plaintiff's claims). Moreover, legitimate
plaintiffs might fear the loss of a tactical advantage by voluntarily disclosing informa-
tion early in the case. See id. (arguing that a plaintiff's attempt to lend credence to her
claim during settlement negotiations can jeopardize later success should a trial take
place). For a general discussion of incentives to disclose information voluntarily, see
Shavell, supra note 17.
17 Furthermore, the assumption that parties are risk-neutral is fairly realistic when
the defendant is a large corporation, the plaintiff retains a lawyer on contingency, and
the stakes represent a small or moderate fraction of defendant's wealth. See supra note
42 (discussing risk preferences and the effect of contingent fees). In any event, frivo-
lous litigation is likely to be more severe when parties are risk averse because of the
greater tendency of risk-averse parties to settle. See POSNER, supra note 42, at 557
(discussing the effect of variations in risk tolerance on the likelihood of settlement).
158 See FED. K. CIV. P. 56(f) (permitting courts to grant continuances allowing for
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The models do make a number of unrealistic assumptions, but
more realism is not likely to alter their most important qualitative
predictions. For instance, it is not essential to assume homogeneous
trial success in meritorious suits or perfect accuracy in meritless
suits. 13 9 When these assumptions are relaxed in the informed-plaintiff
model, the basic results remain the same. '4  Although I am less cer-
tain of the effect in the informed-defendant model (because I have
not solved the more complex case), the intuition behind the basic re-
sults is powerful enough to warrant confidence. 4'
further discovery instead of awarding summary judgment); WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d
1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1988) (hinting that courts should rarely grant summary judg-
ment before adequate discovery);John F. Lapham, Summary Judgment Before the Comple-
tion of Discovery: A Proposed Revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56y), 24 U. MICH. J.L.
REFoRM 253, 254-55 (1990) (arguing that the tendency of courts to allow additional
discovery whenever it might be useful has prevented early dismissal of frivolous suits).
Indeed, courts are especially reluctant to grant summary judgment when no discovery
has yet taken place and the defendant might have sole possession of relevant evidence.
See id. at 273-74 & n.102. The latter condition is obviously easy to satisfy in the in-
formed-defendant cases, since the defendants are the ones with the private informa-
tion.
139 More complex models typically assume a continuum of plaintiff types indexed
by probability of trial success. See Bebchuk, supra note 83, at 442-43 (employing a
model that assumes plaintiff has private information about the expected trial award
and allows that award to vary continuously); Katz, supra note 17, at 20-25 (analyzing a
model in which probability of success varies continuously). These models can take
account of trial error by assigning frivolous suits a strictly positive probability of trial
success.
140 Frivolous suits are filed, a significant fraction of those suits receive positive set-
tlements, and a large number of legitimate suits go to trial rather than settle due to
the presence of frivolous suits. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 17, at 20-25 (demonstrating
that these results hold when the probability of success varies continuously). In Katz's
continuous type model, however, increasing the stakes does not always exacerbate the
frivolous suit problem; instead, the direction of the effect depends on how types are
distributed. See id. at 22-25. This distinction, however, may not be all that significant.
Parties make choices within the limits of bounded rationality, see supra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text, and so they might have trouble figuring out what to do with a con-
tinuum of suits. A natural response would be to reduce the continuum to a few dis-
crete categories, such as "strong cases," "moderate cases," "weak cases" and "frivolous
cases." See generally Katz, supra note 27, at 248 (making the same general point).
141 Put simply, the intuition is this: If defendants have information about suit type
which they might disclose during settlement negotiations, plaintiffs will rely on those
negotiations, at least sometimes, to learn the information. Thus, plaintiffs will not al-
ways investigate-unless an investigation is very inexpensive. After all, if plaintiffs did
always investigate, they would forfeit the chance of learning more cheaply from de-
fendants, and that would be irrational. Similarly, rational defendants, who anticipate
that some plaintiffs will be uninformed, will obviously pool some of the time on the
chance that the plaintiff in the particular case is ignorant and can be tricked. The im-
portant thing to note is that none of this reasoning depends on strong assumptions
about trial success or trial error.
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Nor is it necessary to the informed-defendant model that none of
the investigation costs be recoupable later in the litigation. The basic
results remain the same, even when investigation saves on discovery,
as long as the savings are not too large. Moreover, it is possible to
construct a model in which investigation reduces but does not elimi-
nate uncertainty, without changing the basic results. 3
Furthermore, relaxing the assumption of zero transaction costs at
the settlement stage simply changes the payoffs without any major ef-
fect. The assumption that settlement takes place only once, and then
always before discovery, is potentially more troubling, but it turns out
not to be all that restrictive. For one thing, in view of the high cost of
discovery, parties have much to gain by settling early, and the avail-
able empirical evidence suggests that many suits conclude without
much discovery actually taking place.'4 Moreover, when our simple
models are modified to allow for a second settlement stage after the
completion of discovery, the basic qualitative predictions do not
change markedly. 45 Although this second opportunity relieves some
142 This is a perfectly reasonable proviso. Whether or not plaintiffs investigate,
they still must prepare discovery requests and respond to those promulgated by the
defendant, and they still must sift through all the documents and other information
defendants provide. If investigation saves anything at the discovery stage, it is likely to
save mostly on follow-up discovery.
143 The effect, however, is not as clear for a more complex model that allows con-
tinuous investment. One can construct such a model by assuming that investigation
produces a signal with more information value the more plaintiffs invest, and that
plaintiffs rely on the signal to update their prior beliefs using Bayes's Rule. Cf
Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 401, 428-31 (1988) (using this approach to construct a non-game-
theoretic model of contract investigation). Nevertheless, I tend to think that a dis-
crete model is more realistic than a continuous one given the limits of bounded ra-
tionality. See supra note 140 (suggesting that it would be natural for parties to reduce a
continuum of suits to a few discrete categories).
1 See PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATION
PROCESS: DISCOVERY 36-46 (1978) (noting that few cases involve much discovery activ-
ity, but not clearly indicating how much of this is due to early settlement); Linda
Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Con-
sequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1432-42 (1994) (reviewing
empirical studies that show little discovery in civil cases whether in state or federal
court); Early Endings, WALL ST.J., Feb. 11, 1994, at B5 (chart) (reporting a high rate of
settlement before completion of pretrial discovery). Moreover, contingency fee ar-
rangements create strong incentives for the plaintiff's attorney to settle early. See
Clermont & Currivan, supra note 78, at 536 (noting that the economic interests of a
lawyer and her client are only partially aligned, and that contingency fee lawyers have
a direct economic incentive to "obtain a respectable settlement with relatively slight
effort").
143 It is also possible to allow for settlement at more than two stages. See generally
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of the pressure on the defendant, settling early still avoids the poten-
tially high cost of discovery, which generates enough pressure to pro-
duce similar equilibrium results.
146
Furthermore, it is not necessary to have the defendant make the
settlement offer. Switching to the plaintiff has different effects in the
two different models, and although the analysis is a bit complicated, it
can be shown that similar qualitative results obtain.
147
The take-it-or-leave-it nature of the offer may be the most prob-
lematic assumption of all. It makes the model highly tractable, but it
abstracts from the give-and-take of settlement negotiations. Bargain-
ing behavior is complex, so complex in fact that the modeling litera-
ture is not yet sophisticated enough to capture all the nuances.41
Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 93 (1992)
(showing that multistage bargaining produces a deadline effect when the defendant
has private information and the plaintiff makes all the offers).
46 If defendants always learn whether a suit is meritorious at the discovery stage,
the parties have complete information, so all meritorious suits settle at that point. As a
result, a new game can be constructed for each of our models, which is identical to the
original game except that it terminates immediately after discovery. Since the new
game has the same structure as the original game-with discovery rather than trial at
the terminal stage-the equilibrium structure is the same, except for somewhat differ-
ent rates of filing, settlement and litigation. For example, in the informed-plaintiff
model, the same two equilibria exist, but the first equilibrium holds less often and
offers are made less frequently in the second equilibrium, with the result that discov-
ery costs are wasted in more legitimate suits.
147 In the informed-plaintiff model, for example, the game becomes a signaling
game, since plaintiff communicates information about suit type by his choice of set-
tlement offer. See RASMUSEN, supra note 18, at 249-68 (explaining the phenomenon of
signaling). The solution involves many of the same elements that we saw at work in
the informed-defendant model (which is also a signaling game). See supra Part V.B.
Legitimate plaintiffs make a high demand and frivolous plaintiffs try to pool. Antici-
pating this strategy, defendants sometimes reject the high demand in order to force
separation. As a result, some legitimate suits go to trial, some frivolous plaintiffs sue,
and some frivolous suits yield high settlements.
The effect is not as easily discernible in the informed-defendant model. Al-
though defendants can no longer signal by choosing an offer, they can still signal by
choosing how to respond to plaintiffs' offers. Accordingly, defendants in meritorious
suits still try to pool with defendants in meritless suits, and plaintiffs litigate sometimes
when defendants reject (or investigate if that is cheaper) in order to force separation.
The result is a similar tripartite equilibrium structure. See Nalebuff, supra note 13, at
205 (showing that uninformed plaintiffs in a model with continuous case strength will
make low offers in order to maintain a credible litigation threat).
148 See, e.g., KREPS, supra note 18, at 91-97, 106-07, 123-28 (exploring the limits of
game theory for modeling bargaining behavior). See generally RASMUSEN, supra note
18, at 275-90 (describing game theory models of bargaining). Indeed, bargaining
need not even follow the usual offer/counteroffer format. Parties have access to a
wide range of more complex mechanisms, such as settlement escrows, that can en-
hance bargaining efficiency. See, e.g., Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settle-
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Even so, there is much to learn from a model that relies on a simple
take-it-or-leave-it assumption. For one thing, it is a great improve-
ment over the usual ad hoc approach that ignores strategic behavior.
Furthermore, since the basic qualitative predictions of the take-it-or-
leave-it model depend on informational asymmetry, they may well
survive in models that allow for more complex bargaining dynam-
ics 149ics.
m
There are other simplifying features as well. The models focus on
two-party lawsuits while litigation can involve more complex party
structures. Furthermore, the models ignore the effects of liability-
sharing rules, such as joint and several liability (with or without rights
of contribution).' 50 A model, though, must simplify to be useful. And
the basic logic of the models discussed here is powerful-a party with
private information will seek to exploit the informational asymmetry;
his opponent will try to deny him the advantage, and neither party
will succeed completely. Thus, frivolous suits will be filed and legiti-
mate suits tried. More complex models will no doubt refine and am-
plify these predictions, but the results derived here provide a useful
foundation for understanding the basic dynamics of frivolous litiga-
tion and for guiding regulation.
2. External Factors
It remains to be seen whether there are factors external or exog-
ment Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 87 (1995) (analyzing a bargaining model which in-
cludes a settlement escrow mechanism that facilitates settlement and reduces costs).
At the same time, it is worth noting that there is no way to achieve perfect efficiency
for all potential trades when information is asymmetric. See Roger B. Myerson & Mark
A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 265
(1983) (concluding that it is generally impossible to have an efficient bilateral trading
mechanism where information is asymmetric).
149 Actually, the take-it-or-leave-it assumption might not be as unrealistic as it
seems. If likelihood of settlement is high during the pretrial stage, then the parties
might experience a take-it-or-leave-it quality to an offer made on the eve of trial.
While this is not the same thing as a take-it-or-leave-it offer before discovery, the pros-
pect of a hard offer at a later point can put pressure on earlier offers. See Andrew F.
Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Settlement Negotiations oith Too-Sided Asymmetric In-
formation: ModelDuality, Information Distribution, and Efficiency, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
283, 287 (1994) (justifying two-stage litigation bargaining models by the pressure of
trial and high bargaining costs).
10 These rules can affect settlements in significant ways. See, e.g., Lewis A. Korn-
hauser & Richard L. Revesz, Multidefendant Settlements Under Joint and Several Liability:
The Problem of Insolvency, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1994) (examining the problems that
arise in cases involving multiple defendants, one or more of whom is potentially insol-
vent).
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enous to the models that might affect their predictions. In particular,
it is important to examine ways that the parties might deter frivolous
suits on their own. We saw that a fighting strategy could act as a de-
terrent in complete information models.15 ' But this happy result is
not possible when information is asymmetric." For example, plain-
tiffs still file meritless suits in the informed-defendant model even
though defendants fight by always refusing to settle.5 3  Moreover,
when defendants do not know which suits are frivolous, as in the in-
formed-plaintiff model, they must fight legitimate suits as well, so
fighting is too costly.
15 4
Nevertheless, there are two ways for parties to reduce the frivolous
suit problem in an asymmetric information model: by relying on
reputation, or by using a bond. First, consider the reputation op-
tion.15 5 When a plaintiff chooses a lawyer or law firm5, with a known
reputation for always investigating and filing only meritorious suits,
defendants can rely on that reputation to cure any informational
asymmetry that blocks early settlement. 57  Furthermore, lawyers
1 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
1 Moreover, unlike the case with complete information, it is not even theoreti-
cally possible for prefiling settlement to eliminate all wasted litigation costs when in-
formation is asymmetric. Cf supra note 72 (noting that all frivolous suits should settle
before filing where complete information exists). Indeed, this is one advantage of an
asymmetric information model: it explains the actual filing of frivolous suits.
3 In practice, a defendant might also report plaintiffs attorney to disciplinary
authorities or retaliate by filing a malicious prosecution action. SeeWade, supra note 2,
at 437-50 (discussing the tort of malicious civil prosecution). The malicious civil
prosecution tort, however, requires that plaintiffs prove malice, which is extremely dif-
ficult to do. See id. at 438, 444-45 (concluding that restrictions in some states "render
the cause of action essentially unavailable").
154 In fact, defendants in the informed-plaintiff model already fight to the optimal
extent. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. They do not fight more
because the cost is too high.
155 For an extremely useful discussion of reputation mechanisms in litigation, see
Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 56, at 522-34.
im I refer to firms as well as lawyers because a reputation market might work better
for law firms. See id. at 529 n.55, 531 n.60 (discussing the difficulty of a reputation
market developing for individual lawyers and the greater likelihood of one developing
for law firms). While an individual lawyer looks forward to a finite litigating life, a firm
views litigation as an indefinitely repeated game in which it can gain in the long run by
establishing a reputation for filing only legitimate suits. See supra note 77 (discussing
the role of indefinite repetition).
157 For example, in the informed-plaintiff model, a legitimate plaintiff reliably sig-
nals an uninformed defendant that suit is legitimate by selecting a law firm with a
reputation for filing only (or mostly) legitimate suits. In the informed-defendant
model, the plaintiff signals the defendant that she has investigated by selecting a law
firm that always (or almost always) investigates.
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should be able to charge plaintiffs a premium for furnishing an early
settlement, a premium high enough to induce the lawyer to develop
and maintain the necessary reputation."8
A reputation mechanism is viable, however, only when conditions
are favorable to the formation of a reputation market. For one
thing, defendants must be able to detect frivolous filings. Detection is
possible in both the informed-plaintiff and the informed-defendant
models, but only some of the time.'6 Moreover, reading a firm's
reputation from its litigation track record is likely to be imprecise, es-
pecially if reputation is a matter of degree. 6' As a result, defendants
may find it optimal to excuse the occasional lapse. The upshot is that
some filings will be frivolous even under the best of circumstances.'62
An effective reputation market also requires clients who know the
reputations of different law firms and can shop around. Large corpo-
rate clients are likely to fit this profile, but individuals are not. The
desire to attract corporate business might be enough inducement for
some firms to compete over reputation, but not firms, such as the
plaintiff's tort bar, that specialize in representing individuals.'
Plaintiffs can also reduce the informational asymmetry by using a
138 Strictly speaking, plaintiffs in our two models are indifferent between settling
and going to trial, but this is just an artifact of the take-it-or-leave-it bargaining assump-
tion. In real litigation, the plaintiff will be strictly better off settling early rather than
going to trial, so she should be willing to pay an attorney a premium for the greater
assurance of settlement. See generally POSNER, supra note 42, at 554-60 (describing the
general theory of settlement).
159 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 56, at 546-50 (analyzing factors such as the
size of the legal community, complexity of the legal market, and geographical variance
in "legal culture," which influence the likelihood that a reputation market will de-
velop). Moreover, an attorney will invest in reputation only to the point where the
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. In the informed-defendant model, this
condition can sometimes undermine incentives to acquire reputation in a mixed equi-
librium.
160 For example, defendants know a suit is frivolous in the informed-plaintiff
model only when they refuse to settle, since in that case, frivolous plaintiffs always
dro and legitimate plaintiffs always litigate.
See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 56, at 539-40, 548-49.
162 This result is likely to be reinforced by the possibility of mistakes and occasional
attorney defection from a firm's litigation policy. Of course, lapses might be very rare
if defendants lost all faith in a firm's reputation upon observing a single lapse. How-
ever, defendants are not likely to do this because they still benefit from making high
offers to a firm that lapses only occasionally.
163 This might help to explain the concern about frivolous personal injury tort
suits. See generally Michael Selz & Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, Scared of Lawsuits, Small
Businesses Applaud Reform, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1995, at B1 (highlighting business con-
cerns about frivolous tort suits).
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bonding strategy." ' The bonding alternative is a way for a truthful
party to impose costs on a party who falsely claims that a suit is legiti-
mate (as in the informed-plaintiff model), or that an investigation has
been conducted (as in the informed-defendant model). To demon-
strate bonding, I will focus on the informed-plaintiff model and use
the John and Mary hypothetical'z Assume that John's suit is legiti-
mate, that the $10,000 total litigation costs are split evenly between
discovery ($5000) and trial ($5000), and that discovery reveals suit
type perfectly. Furthermore, assume that courts are perfectly accurate
at the pretrial stage.
Eager to persuade Mary that his suit is legitimate, John says some-
thing like the following:
I am a legitimate plaintiff. I know that you don't believe
me because I would say the same thing if I were frivolous. But
let me prove it to you. I will commit to paying you $20,000 in
any of the following three circumstances: (1) if I drop my suit
voluntarily except as part of a settlement; (2) if my suit is ever
dismissed involuntarily; or (3) if summary judgment is ever
granted in your favor. You and I both know that if I am legi-
timate, I will never actually have to pay the $20,000 bond. A
legitimate plaintiff is better off going to trial than dropping,
and since the court is perfectly accurate at the pretrial stage,
you will never obtain an involuntary dismissal or summary
judgment. On the other hand, if I am frivolous, I will have to
pay the $20,000 bond if you refuse to settle, because in that
case I would drop rather than litigate further. After all, it
costs a frivolous plaintiff $26,000 to go through discovery,' r"
but only $21,000 to drop. 7 You must admit then that it is
much more likely for a legitimate plaintiff to enter into this
deal than a frivolous one. It follows that a $20,000 bond will
screen out a lot of frivolous suits, and so it makes sense for
you to offer the settlement more frequently, being more con-
16 On bonding mechanisms generally, see Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commit-
ments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983) (discussing
mechanisms to ensure commitment).
16 See supra Part VAL1.
166 $1000 (filing cost) + $5000 (discovery cost) + $20,000 (bond) = $26,000.
167 $1000 (filing cost) + $20,000 (bond) = $21,000.
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fident that your opponent is legitimate.' 8
John's logic is impeccable, and Mary, being rational, must agree.
In this simple situation, the bond, a conditional payment of $20,000,
creates no additional risk for John because he has a legitimate suit,
but it creates considerable risk for any frivolous plaintiff who tries to
mimic. This will not deter all frivolous plaintiffs in equilibrium, but it
will deter a significant number and thus make defendants more will-
ing to settle.' 9' As the amount of the bond rises, a greater number of
frivolous plaintiffs are deterred from filing and defendants become
even more willing to settle. Legitimate plaintiffs benefit from the en-
hanced prospect of settlement, and this benefit gives them an incen-
tive to employ the bonding strategy.
The basic mechanism is similar in the informed-defendant model,
except that the bond penalizes uninformed plaintiffs who falsely
claim to have investigated.. In both models, bonding acts as a private
analogue to Rule 11, a way for private parties to create a sanctioning
system by contract. 17° There are limits to the utility of this device,
however. The bond is costless only on the unrealistic assumption that
courts never make mistakes. If instead courts occasionally grant
summary judgment in legitimate suits, then truthful plaintiffs, like
John, expect to pay the bond sometimes, and this reduces the value of
suit. 7' As the amount of the bond increases, the marginal cost in
terms of reduced value rises, while the marginal deterrence benefit
IbS This last step in the argument generalizes from John and Mary. In effect, John
is saying to Mary: "If you always accept the $20,000 bond, then proportionately more
legitimate plaintiffs will offer it than will frivolous plaintiffs, so you will be able to use
the bond as a signal (albeit an imperfect one) that suit is legitimate."
169 Suppose the fraction of potential frivolous suits is 50%. It can be shown that a
$20,000 bond reduces the frequency of frivolous filings from 2/3 to 2/5, or by about
27%, and increases the frequency with which defendant makes the high offer from
1/30 to 21/50, or by about 39%. For formulae that can be used to calculate these re-
suits, see Katz, supra note 17, at 19-20 (analyzing the effect of a deposit in the in-
formed-plaintiff model, which is equivalent to a bond when courts are perfectly accu-
rate).
170 Mathematically, the effect is precisely the same as a Rule 11 sanction that is per-
fectly enforced.
For example, suppose courts in our John and Mary hypothetical erroneously
grant summary judgment in legitimate suits 10% of the time and suppose they always
do so immediately after discovery. IfJohn does not give a bond, the expected value of
his legitimate suit after filing is: 0.9 x (0.8 x $50,000 -$10,000) - 0.1 x $5000 = $26,500.
On the other hand, if John gives a bond in the amount of $20,000, he anticipates ac-
tually paying it 10% of the time, so the expected value of his suit after filing is:
0.9 x (0.8 x $50,000 - $10,000) - 0.1 x ($5000 + $20,000) = $24,500.
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declines. At some point, marginal cost just equals marginal benefit,
and plaintiffs will not bond for any greater amount. Thus, judicial
error caps the optimal size of the bond and so limits the effectiveness
of a bonding strategy. 17
D. Summary
Before proceeding with the regulatory analysis, it is useful to list
the most salient conclusions of the two asymmetric information
models:
* Frivolous suits are most likely to occur in litigation settings with
asymmetric information, where one party has critical private
information about liability that he cannot easily communicate in a
credible way (and especially when summary judgment is difficult to
obtain before discovery).
* Although a meritless suit is always frivolous in the informed-
plaintiff model, it is most clearly frivolous in the informed-defendant
model when the conditions for a mixed equilibrium are satisfied; that
is, when investigation costs are moderate.
e Frivolous litigation is problematic because it generates wasted
litigation costs and unjustified wealth transfers.
* A reputation market can reduce these problems, but it is likely
to be least effective in those practice settings that feature a specialized
plaintiff's bar representing mostly individual rather than corporate
clients.
* Bonding can also be useful, but it is likely to be least effective
and least desirable from a social point of view when the risk ofjudicial
error at the pretrial stage is relatively high-especially the risk of mis-
taken grants of summary judgment in meritorious suits.
The two models also produce different, and sometimes inconsis-
tent, predictions:
* Most significantly for our purposes, the two models make oppo-
site predictions about how frivolous suit problems vary with expected
trial award in a meritorious suit. In the informed-plaintiff model, the
problems are likely to be most severe in those litigation settings where
172 The risk of an erroneous denial of summaryjudgment also reduces the utility of
a bonding strategy by reducing the chance that a lying plaintiff would actually have to
pay the bond. Truthful plaintiffs can offset this effect to some extent by agreeing to
pay the bond even if they lose at trial. But with trial error, such a strategy is likely to
reduce the value of suit considerably-so much so, in fact, that plaintiffs will rarely be
willing to employ it.
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the expected trial award is relatively high on average.'73 By contrast, in
the informed-defendant model (focusing on the mixed equilibrium),
the problems are likely to be most severe where the expected trial
award is relatively low. 74
e Furthermore, the most salient policy concern-litigation costs,
unjustified wealth transfers, or both-can differ between the two
models for a fixed fraction of potential meritless suits. For example,
in the informed-plaintiff model, a relatively small fraction produces
an equilibrium in which the only serious concern is unjustified wealth
transfers (since all frivolous suits settle early), but in the informed-
defendant model, a small fraction can support an equilibrium in
which both litigation costs and unjustified wealth transfers are serious
175concerns.
VI. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
We now turn to the question of what this positive account of frivo-
lous litigation tells us about regulation. The goal of any regulatory
scheme, whether it involves strict pleading, penalties or judicial
screening, is, loosely stated, to minimize the problems of frivolous
litigation without creating too many new problems along the way. 76 It
is important to see what this goal does not involve. It does not seek to
eliminate all frivolous suits whatever the cost, nor does it seek to avoid
all adverse effects on meritorious suits. The goal, instead, is to strike
a sensible balance between the benefit of reducing frivolous suits and
the regulatory costs.
One needs a normative standard to strike this balance. It is
tempting to conclude that the use of formal models entails a com-
mitment to efficiency. But this is mistaken. Formal analysis, as posi-
173 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
14 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. These predictions depend some-
what more strongly than the others on the modeling assumptions, but they still
warrant enough confidence tojustify cautious reliance.
13 The nature of the unjustified wealth transfer also differs. In the informed-
plaintiff model, wealth transfers reward meritless plaintiffs and never benefit defen-
dants, whereas in the informed-defendant model, wealth transfers reward defendants
in meritorious suits and never benefit plaintiffs. Furthermore, it is worth noting that
while potential meritiess suits always create problems in the informed-plaintiff model,
no matter how large a fraction they represent, they create no problems at all in the
informed-defendant model when their fraction is very large (since then suit is NEV
unless plaintiff investigates). CompareAppendix, II withAppendix, III.A.
I76 1 state the goal in this way in order to allow for all possible normative theories,
notjust efficiency.
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tive theory, is not necessarily tied to normative law and economics.
Indeed, formal modeling can be useful for any normative theory that
counts consequences, including fights-based theories that make a
person's rights depend to some extent on the consequences that flow
from their exercise,' 77 and fairness theories that measure fairness by
reference to distributive effects. In the following discussion, I focus
on the familiar efficiency-based theory that views adjudication as an
instrument for applying the substantive law accurately to create effi-
cient incentives ex ante.'79 But, I also refer at times to implications for
a rights-based theory that views adjudication in terms of enforcing in-
dividual rights.
A word of caution at the outset: Given the limitations of game-
theoretic models,"8 one must be careful when making policy recom-
mendations. Yet, so long as one refrains from overly broad claims,
the insights derived from modeling can be extremely useful to regula-
tion. This is especially true of litigation reform today, which is in
great need of a more sophisticated approach to predicting strategic
effects. Indeed, the effort will be worthwhile if it identifies questions
and concerns that deserve more careful attention from policy-
makers."
177 For example, if one believed that each party had a right to the outcome that
would result if all parties were fully informed, then one would have to recognize a
violation of that right each time a meritorious plaintiff dropped (as happens in the
informed-defendant model). See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72 (1985) (describing a more complex rights-based theory
that still counts consequences).
178 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a
World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 617-50 (1993) (reviewing the standard
arguments used to defend aggregation against process-oriented objections and then
examining the distributional problem in the sampling context).
1,1 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 42, at 549 (describing the economic goal of the
procedural system as minimizing costs); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1086-
87 (1989) (summarizing the economic approach to procedural analysis).
ISO See, e.g., KREPS, supra note 18, at 91-132 (discussing problems with game-
theoretic methods).
It might seem that some of the points I discuss in this Part could have been de-
rived without the formal models. This is true for some, but it is not true for many of
the most important insights. The problem is that once the intuition is understood, it
often seems as if the point could have been derived straightforwardly through the
same intuitive logic used to explain it. As it turns out, however, we often need the
rigor of a formal analysis to bring the intuition to light and to understand its implica-
tions and limits fully. In this way, game theory has a tendency to eat its own tail:
game-theoretic tools are extremely useful to understand the nature of complicated
problems, but once intuitive understanding is achieved, those tools are often no
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A. Is Any Public Regulation Desirable?
1. The Seriousness of the Problem
The results of our formal analysis neither rule out nor clearly con-
firm a serious frivolous suit problem. However, they do indicate that
if problems exist, they are likely to arise in situations quite different
from those emphasized in the more sensational popular accounts.
Those accounts tend to focus on cases of complete information, in
which the plaintiff's attorney manages to extort a nuisance settlement
from a defendant who knows the suit is meritless and is outraged by
the filing. By contrast, the formal models emphasize the effect of
asymmetric information.'82 Yet, it is still difficult to assess the severity
of the frivolous suit problem even in asymmetric information cases,
because of the availability of self-help measures such as reputation
markets and bonding strategies."3
Given this uncertainty, we cannot rule out the desirability of regu-
lation altogether, but neither can we be confident that extensive regu-
lation is warranted. We need much more empirical information, and
the formal analysis can help in at least two ways.
First, although it is difficult to use rigorous empirical methods
because of the problems with measuring frivolous suits directly, it is
still possible to obtain some information from reports of widely-shared
experience in practice communities. This kind of information is not
altogether reliable, but it is not totally worthless either. To the extent
that the information confirms predictions generated formally from
the models, it provides support for those predictions and for the pre-
dictive power of the models more generally.
Second, to the extent one has confidence in a model's predic-
tions, those predictions can set an agenda for useful empirical work.
For example, the models in this Article identify systematic relation-
ships between the most problematic effects of frivolous litigation and
variables that are easier to measure: typical information structure,
opportunities for credible transmission of private information about
the merits, judicial attitudes toward summary judgment before and
after discovery, the use of bonding strategies, and the structure of at-
longer needed-and it may seem as if they were never needed at all. For a similar ob-
servation, see id. at 88 (noting that game theory does best at clarifying latent intuitions
and pushing those intuitions into more complex situations).
iss See supra Part V.
See supra notes 155-72 and accompanying text.
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torney markets (especially conditions for acquisition of reputation).
Casual empiricism, for instance, suggests rough sortings of lawyers ac-
cording to their reputation for reasonable litigation conduct, at least
in some practice settings.1 4 More rigorous empirical studies might
identify factors that facilitate this kind of sorting process, such as the
size of legal practice communities, the frequency of interaction
among lawyers, and the nature of the clientele.'8 With these data in
hand, one can use the models to identify areas of potential concern
without the need to count frivolous suits directly. Indeed, it might
even be possible to discover ways to facilitate private solutions such as
reputation markets."'
2. The Need for a General Norm
Whether or not enforcement is a good idea, one type of regula-
tion is absolutely necessary: promulgation of a general rule, such as
Rule 11 (and 28 U.S.C. § 1927), that defines the domain of permis-
sible litigation. It may seem odd to propose a rule without also guar-
anteeing an official means of enforcement, but enforcement is not
always necessary to a rule's efficacy. 7 People sometimes obey rules in
the absence of sanctions simply because they believe following rules is
the right thing to do, or because they agree with the principle that
the particular rule expresses. Moreover, rules can be enforced in-
formally through reputation. Indeed, a rule prohibiting frivolous
suits might encourage the formation of reputation markets with bene-
ficial deterrence effects. 188
To achieve these objectives, however, such a rule must express its
184 See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 56, at 541-46 (describing a sorting be-
tween cooperative and hard-ball litigators in family law practice).
183 See id. at 546-50 (suggesting some of these factors); see also Marshall et al., supra
note 12, at 975-81 (listing factors affecting Rule 11 activity).
186 See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 56, at 550-64 (making a similar sugges-
tion in the context of analyzing incentives to overinvest in litigation).
187 Furthermore, foundational rules like this one have a constitutive function that
gives them value whether or not people actually comply. Procedural rules in effect
constitute a system of civil adjudication, much as the rules of baseball constitute the
game. On the difference between constitutive and regulative rules, see John Rawls,
Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 18-29 (1955).
188 For example, a relatively clear and public definition of frivolousness could
make it easier to evaluate a lawyer's reputation. See supra note 162 (noting the prob-
lem of noisy signals that make identifying lawyer cooperation very difficult). Further-
more, it might also serve as a focal point to attract parties to a reputation equilibrium.
See RASMUSEN, supra note 18, at 28-29 (explaining focal points).
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prescriptive choices as clearly as possible. The current version of Rule
11 falls short of this ideal; it provides litigants, lawyers and judges with
little guidance about how to determine whether a suit is frivolous.'"
To illustrate, consider the critical question of when a lawyer's prefil-
ing investigation should be deemed inadequate.' 0 Rule 11 states the
standard in vague language: plaintiffs and their attorneys have a duty
to conduct "an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances."" Sec-
tion (b) (3) expands on this basic requirement somewhat by allowing
factual allegations without evidentiary support when they are
"specifically so identified" and "are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discov-
ery." '92 Yet this section is also qualified by the general requirement of
a "reasonable inquiry."93 Courts have created factors to be consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis, but these factors are general and conclu-
sory and their application is highly fact-dependent.1
4
189 When 1983 Rule 11 was in effect, one frequently read or heard complaints of
vagueness, inconsistency and unpredictability. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11
Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1015-17 (1988) (citing inconsistent applications of
1983 Rule 11 as evidence of its unpredictability); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing
Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 639-42 (1987) (discussing the
"uncertainty over when a legal argument is sufficiently plausible" to avoid Rule 11
sanctions). This problem still exists with the 1993 version.
190 The current version of Rule 11 also provides little guidance for determining
when a weak legal argument lacks merit. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 11(b)(2) & advisory com-
mittee's note. One way to furnish more guidance would be to use modifiers, such as
"strong," "reasonable" or "rational," to indicate the kind of support in established
precedent a novel legal argument must have. Moreover, different modifiers could be
used for different kinds of cases, perhaps allowing weaker support in civil rights suits
to reflect the special importance of creative argument in the constitutional field. See
supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing a civil rights example).
191FED. R. CiV. P. 11(b); see also FED. R. CV. P. 11 (1983) (requiring "reasonable
inquiry").
FED. R. CwV. P. 11 (b) (3).
193 SeeFED. R. CrV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993) (cautioning that (b) (3)
"does not relieve litigants from the obligation to conduct an appropriate investigation
into the facts that is reasonable under the circumstances").
194 One court listed the factors as follows:
[WIhether the signer of the documents had sufficient time for investigation;
the extent to which the attorney had to rely on his or her client for the factual
foundation underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper; whether the
case was accepted from another attorney; the complexity of the facts and the
attorney's ability to do a sufficient pre-filing investigation; and whether dis-
covery would have been beneficial to the development of the underlying
facts.
Brown v. Federation of State Med. Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987), quoted in
Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 689 (7th Cir. 1990). Some of these factors
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Although reasonableness must turn to some extent on the facts of
each case, the formal analysis points the way to a more helpful formu-
lation of the general standard. According to the informed-defendant
model, a prefiling investigation is most strongly justified in the mixed
equilibrium where plaintiffs investigate sometimes but not always"9 )
This suggests a way to express the reasonableness standard in Rule 11:
A prefiling investigation is reasonable if it is the kind of investigation a ra-
tional plaintiff would undertake when her only other alternative for learning
whether her suit has merit is to conduct discovery.
This formulation, in effect, forces the plaintiff's attorney to ignore
the possibility of obtaining information about suit type from the de-
fendant's settlement offer. The reason for eliminating this option is
that it is responsible for the strategic interaction that generates high
social costs in the mixed equilibrium.'O Moreover, the formulation
defines a perspective from which reasonableness can be assessed-the
perspective of the rational plaintiff who knows that if she does not in-
vestigate she must make all significant litigation decisions before dis-
covery without knowing whether she has a frivolous suit. This is im-
portant. The reference to rationality identifies a motivation for
choice-individual utility maximization-and the focus on the ra-
tional plaintiff rather than the rational attorney brackets agency prob-
lems.
The standard instructs a judge or lawyer to compare the cost of
investigation with the average cost of obtaining the same information
by filing and litigating to the discovery stage, discounted by the likeli-
hood of a meritless suit. This is the same calculation that a rational
plaintiff would perform when comparing prefiling investigation to
discovery as alternative means for learning the suit type. Moreover, it
follows from the importance of predictability and cost-minimization
that the calculation should be done for general categories of cases on
the basis of average values, rather than for each individual suit.
9 7
track those mentioned in the advisory committee note to 1983 Rule 11. See FED. R
CIrv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983) (noting that courts should consider "such
factors as how much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had
to rely on a client for information as to the facts ... ; whether the pleading ... was based
on a plausible view of the law; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel or an-
other member of the bar").
19 See supra Part V.B.3.
19 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
197 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 568-96 (1992) (discussing how predictability and cost-minimization affect the
choice between rules and standards). Moreover, by using my suggested formulation,
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B. Targeted Versus Uniform Enforcement
I now turn to the issue of enforcement. The critical questions
here are whether the general norm prohibiting frivolous suits should
be enforced at all, and if it should, in what litigation contexts and by
what sort of device. The answers to these questions depend on the
balance of benefits and costs for different enforcement schemes.
One might adopt no enforcement at all, a uniform enforcement
scheme, or a targeted scheme that varies with case type. The choice
among these alternatives requires a much more detailed analysis than
is possible in this Article. Nevertheless, the formal models shed light
on the choice between the second and the third options: uniform
versus targeted enforcement. A uniform approach works best when
the nature of the problem is relatively homogeneous across different
litigation settings. When the problem varies substantially from set-
ting to setting, however, it can be more difficult to design a single,
uniform scheme that works well everyvhere. An effective approach in
one setting might generate high error and administrative costs in
another. Under these circumstances, targeted enforcement tuned to
the differences can sometimes improve on the cost-benefit balance.
The formal analysis strongly suggests that frivolous litigation is a
highly variable phenomenon. The nature and seriousness of the
problems depend on a number of factors that vary from case to case:
information structure, the fraction of potential frivolous suits, the
average strength and stakes of meritorious suits, the existence of
courts could even develop rules establishing investigation requirements for different
kinds of suits. For example, if a large enough fraction of medical malpractice suits
were meritless, it might make sense to adopt a general rule that all plaintiffs must ob-
tain, before filing, an expert opinion from an independent specialist that negligence
could have caused their injury. Cf. Wagner v. Allied Chem. Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1407,
1411-12 (D. Md. 1985) (denying Rule 11 sanctions where the attorney for a products
liability plaintiff consulted an expert and interviewed his clients before filing). The
average cost of getting the opinion would probably be less than the expected cost of
filing and discovery in a meritless suit, assuming the fraction of meritless suits was
large. Furthermore, any such rule could be made presumptive if it was important to
take account of extenuating circumstances. Per se rules are probably superior to pre-
sumptive rules, however, since exceptions undermine predictability and invite litiga-
tion.
198 See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rule-
making, 3J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 270, 273 (1974) (noting the relevance of homogeneity to
over- and under-inclusion and the optimal degree of specificity); Kaplow, supra note
197, at 586-96 (discussing the costs and benefits of greater complexity in rule formula-
tion). The work on rule specificity has tended to focus on the question of the appro-
priate liability norm rather than the best mode of enforcement. However, many of the
same considerations apply to both questions.
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reputation markets, and the availability of bonding strategies. If this
variance is substantial enough, a targeted approach might be superior
to uniform enforcement.
For example, contract disputes are more likely than many other
kinds of litigation to manifest complete (or almost complete) infor-
mation about liability, especially when the contractual relationship
involves periodic opportunities to monitor performance.'9 This
means that frivolous suit problems in the contract setting are not
likely to be as serious as in other litigation contexts. Moreover, such
problems are likely to be even less significant for long-term contract
relationships, because relation-specific investments give parties incen-
tives to act reasonably in order to maintain the relationship.200 These
predictions are consistent with the results of one empirical study that
found less Rule 11 activity in contract cases than in any other case
types surveyed.20 ' If further empirical research were to confirm these
predictions and if it turned out that enforcement was very costly, then
it might be best to leave the norm unenforced in this context.
On the other hand, the formal models predict potentially serious
problems in litigation settings with asymmetric information, such as
products liability, medical malpractice and securities fraud. More-
over, models also help to set enforcement priorities within these cate-
gories by identifying the particular kinds of cases likely to have the
202
worst problems.
Even so, the choice between a uniform and a targeted approach
must take account of the costs of targeted enforcement, including the
cost of designing and promulgating the overall scheme and the cost
203of enforcing it in particular cases. As to the first type of cost, one
1 See, supra, the discussion in the beginning paragraphs of Part IV, which uses a
contract case as an example of complete information.
200 Further, since the parties depend on one another's continuing goodwill, each
can penalize the other for a frivolous filing by withholding cooperation in the future.
See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMIcS 243-47 (1988)
(reviewing the special features of long-term contracts).
201 See Marshall et al., supra note 12, at 966-67, 969 (examining cases under 1983
Rule 11).
202 For example, we saw that problems are likely to be most severe in those in-
formed-plaintiff cases where the expected trial award in meritorious suits is relatively
high, and in those informed-defendant cases where the expected trial award in meri-
torious suits is relatively low. See supra notes 102, 135 and accompanying text.
203 See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 198, at 267-71 (summarizing costs and
benefits of greater precision in rule formulation); Kaplow, supra note 197, at 568-86
(discussing the costs and benefits of ex post judicial determinations versus ex ante rule
formulation).
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must compare the promulgation costs of a targeted approach with
those of a uniform approach. In this regard, it is significant that
rulemakers committed to designing an optimal system will have to
collect much of the same empirical information whichever approach
they choose. After all, even under a uniform approach, optimal selec-
tion of an enforcement device-such as strict pleading, penalties,
screening and the like-will have to take account of the nature and
source of frivolous suit problems. To be sure, promulgation costs will
probably be somewhat higher under a targeted approach, but so too
will the benefits.
The second type of cost is incurred at the enforcement stage.
One potentially significant component is the cost of classifying actual
cases into the distinct categories of the targeted scheme. For exam-
ple, a targeted rule that imposed sanctions in products liability cases
only when reputation markets were "ineffective" would surely invite a
lot of litigation over the effectiveness of reputation in particular con-
texts, as well as strategic maneuvering to take maximum advantage of
the rule's vagueness. If the resulting administrative costs were high
enough, they could overwhelm the benefits of the rule. Thus, a tar-
geted approach should define its case categories as clearly as possible,
and when clarity is not possible, a uniform approach (or at least a tar-
geted approach that ignored the particular distinction) might be
preferable.
It is also important to bear in mind that any evaluation of en-
forcement costs and benefits depends on the reasons for condemning
frivolous suits. For example, unjustified wealth transfers are the main
concern in the informed-plaintiff model when the proportion of po-
tential frivolous suits is relatively low.2°4 Whether this is a sufficient
reason to regulate, however, depends on the normative standard for
evaluating frivolous suits. If the standard is efficiency, wealth trans-
fers are troubling only to the extent that they distort incentives and
then only if the benefit of correcting for the distortion justifies the
enforcement cost. Given the many random factors that can affect
case outcome as well as the potentially high cost of enforcement, the
average wealth transfer would have to be very large indeed to warrant
regulatory intervention.
On the other hand, if the standard is some version of a rights-
204 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (explaining that, under these cir-
cumstances, defendants will offer all plaintiffs the settlement amount that a legitimate
plaintiff would accept).
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based theory, even relatively small transfers might be cause for con-
cern, since any unjustified transfer deprives some party of her full
substantive entitlement.205 Although considerations of cost necessarily
impose practical limits, those limits coexist uneasily with the idea of
rights. 2°6 As a result, a rights theorist will normally demand more by
207way of cost tojustify regulatory inaction.
If some kind of targeted enforcement is optimal, as the foregoing
analysis suggests, then congressional efforts such as the Attorney
Accountability Act,20s designed to reinstate the across-the-board sanc-
tions of 1983 Rule 11, are misguided. Instead, Congress should study
the strategic dynamics of frivolous litigation in different settings and
assess the desirability of targeted enforcement measures. An example
of a targeted approach is the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
209of 1995, which adopts a special enforcement scheme for frivolous
210securities class actions.
C. The Selection of an Enforcement Device
The formal analysis also helps with the selection of an appropriate
enforcement device. Although it is not possible to give a complete
analysis here, I will briefly describe what the models teach about the
desirability of two popular devices -strict pleading and penalties-
205 Some corrective justice theories belong in this category. See, e.g., Bone, supra
note 178, at 605-15 (discussing the implications of correctivejustice theory).
206 This is because a rights-based theory gives claims based on individual rights
priority over claims based on maximizing overall utility or furthering aggregative social
goals. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-100 (1977)
(distinguishing rights from collective goals); THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 112-
16, 131-33 (1979) (comparing the moral logic of rights and utilitarianism). In theory
at least, a rights bearer can demand that her individual right be satisfied even if the
cost of doing so substantially reduces aggregate welfare.
207 See Bone, supra note 178, at 594, 598-605 (emphasizing that to a rights theorist,
arguments based on general cost savings alone will not justify the deprivation of a
right).
s H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995).
" Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
210 This scheme relies on strict pleading, mandatory penalties and restrictions on
representation. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78u-4(b) (2) (strict pleading), 77z-1(c) (mandatory
penalties), 77z-1 (a) (2), (3) (restrictions on representation) (West Supp. 1996).
21, II do not discuss damage caps or fee shifting-the former because it is not as
popular as other devices for deterring frivolous suits, and the latter because the analy-
sis is too complicated. Yet, it is worth mentioning that damage caps will do nothing at
all in those asymmetric information cases that already have moderate expected dam-
age awards. It might even make things worse in the informed-defendant cases if frivo-
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and then make a case for a third and more promising approach-
early judicial screening. I analyze each device assuming that it is the
only one implemented. Any combination can be evaluated according
to the costs and benefits of each of its separate components.
1. Strict Pleading
The standard pleading rule in federal court is notice pleading,
which requires very little factual detail.212 Concerned that such a gen-
erous rule invites frivolous suits, courts and commentators have pro-
posed stricter pleading requirements that mandate more factually
213specific allegations. Proponents of strict pleading argue that a
plaintiff who is required to allege specific facts will have to spend
more to file (and therefore be discouraged from bringing weak suits),
will be forced to know more about the case before filing (and there-
fore be more likely to recognize its weakness), and will make the
merits transparent through his allegations (and therefore facilitate
early dismissal of meritless suits). These benefits turn out to be prob-
lematic, however, and the case for strict pleading becomes much
weaker than commonly supposed when the results of the formal
analysis are taken into account.
First, consider the effect of a strict pleading requirement in the
informed-plaintiff model. When plaintiffs know their suits are frivo-
lous and file anyway, they have no reason to investigate under a strict
pleading rule. They will simply fabricate the necessary allegations.
Moreover, fabrication should be quite easy, since the plaintiff runs
little risk of tipping off an uninformed defendant that he is lying.
Therefore, the only conceivable way strict pleading can affect frivo-
lous litigation in the informed-plaintiff model is indirectly: strict
pleading forces legitimate plaintiffs to investigate more in order to
plead with greater specificity and this increases their filing costs.
However, so long as legitimate plaintiffs are still willing to sue, simply
Ious suit problems increase as the expected trial award declines. See supra note 135
and accompanying text (explaining that efficiency losses increase as the expected trial
award gets smaller). Moreover, when information is asymmetric, fee-shifting is not
likely to help as much as its proponents claim, especially in the informed-plaintiff
cases. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 17, at 17-19 (analyzing the effect of fee shifting rules
on frivolous litigation in the informed-plaintiff model).
212 See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (refusing to apply a more stringent pleading rule); Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) (establishing the notice pleading standard).
213 See sources cited in supra note 4.
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increasing the filing cost has no effect whatsoever on the number of
frivolous filings or the settlement rate. This is because a legitimate
plaintiff's filing cost cannot affect the settlement offer, since filing
costs are already paid by the time the settlement stage is reached.2 4
The analysis is a bit more complicated if strict pleading ends up
shifting costs from the discovery and trial stages to the filing stage, in-
stead of just increasing the cost of filing.21s This would be the case,
for example, if more investigation reduced the need to conduct dis-
covery later in the lawsuit. One can show that the reduction in costs
at the later stages increases the size of the settlement offer, which re-
duces the settlement rate. While this also reduces the number of
frivolous suits, it increases the total trial costs, resulting in an increase
in total litigation costs. 2 ' Thus, strict pleading is not likely to help,
and may even hurt, when plaintiffs are informed.
The results are more ambiguous in the informed-defendant cases.
First, a lawyer pressed for time might be willing to file without know-
ing whether the suit is frivolous, but might balk at making up allega-
tions he knows are fictional. Any lawyer willing to make allegations
without support in a notice pleading system must have questionable
ethics to begin with, but it seems likely that at least some of those law-
yers would be ethical enough to refrain from lying when required to
plead specific facts. Depending on the number of lawyers so inclined,
a strict pleading rule could generate benefits by inducing socially de-
sirable prefiling investigations in the mixed equilibrium.
Second, all lawyers, ethical and unethical alike, run a risk of being
revealed as uninformed whenever they lie. The defendant knows the
true facts, and therefore is more likely than in the informed-plaintiff
model to spot fabricated allegations and infer that the plaintiff has
not investigated. This might reduce frivolous suit problems signifi-
214 This can be seen technically by examining the equilibrium results in Part I.B
of the Appendix. The filing cost (cF) does not appear in the formula for & Moreover,
the cF in the formula for a represents filing costs for a frivolous plaintiff, which are un-
affected by a strict pleading rule.
213 Katz models a strict pleading rule in this way, but he assumes-unrealistically, I
believe-that the shift increases filing costs for frivolous as well as legitimate plaintiffs.
See Katz, supra note 17, at 16-17 (stating that a stricter pleading rule would "increase
costs in all suits").
216 Although I will not do the technical analysis here, it can be shown that the shift
leaves private litigation costs unchanged (the beneficial effect of fewer frivolous filings
just offsets the detrimental effect of more trials), but increases public costs, so long as
the public cost of discovery and trial far exceeds the public cost of processing a frivo-
lous filing.
MODELING FRIVOLOUS SUITS
cantly, but only if the obstacles to successful deception are so high
that inferences are possible much of the time.
17
As a result, strict pleading has some potential benefits, at least in
the informed-defendant cases. At the same time, however, it is likely
to generate substantial costs. A strict pleading rule invites motions to
dismiss, and litigating those motions increases administrative costs.
In addition, such a rule risks screening out meritorious cases when
investigation costs are too high for plaintiffs to obtain the necessary
information before filing. s
On balance, therefore, the case for strict pleading is much weaker
than commonly supposed. The device has some chance of producing
substantial benefits only in the informed-defendant cases, and even in
those cases the benefits are probably limited and the costs potentially
quite high. If the approach is used at all, it should be confined to
those litigation settings involving informed defendants and moderate
investigation costs.
2. Penalties
Penalties are the most popular device for deterring frivolous suits.
Rule 11 uses a penalty approach, as do state analogues to Rule 11.
The problem with penalties, however, is similar to the problem with
strict pleading: penalties have limited benefits and potentially high
costs.
Benefits are limited because of constraints on the size of the
feasible penalty. Risk of error at the penalty stage means that merito-
rious plaintiffs will sometimes have to pay the penalty, and this re-
duces their expected value of suit. For a given error risk, even a
relatively small penalty can turn weak, but still meritorious, cases into
negative expected value suits at the margin. As the penalty amount
rises, the chilling effect spreads to stronger and stronger cases.
Moreover, the effect at any given penalty level will be greater for risk-
217 To confirm this, we would have to solve a different model, one in which the de-
fendant always knows whether the plaintiff has investigated. It is worth mentioning
that these benefits are achieved only for lawsuits in the mixed equilibrium. In particu-
lar, insofar as we are concerned about suits in the filing equilibrium, see supra note 133
and accompanying text, we get no help whatsoever from this signaling effect: all
plaintiffs still file without investigating and meritless suits still produce the same high
costs.
218 One such group of meritorious cases subject to screening includes those cases
that belong to the filing equilibrium of the informed-defendant model. See supra
notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
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averse plaintiffs, since the prospect of a substantial penalty adds risk-
219bearing costs to the litigation.
Moral principles of proportionality can also limit the penalty
amount. For example, a meritless suit filed because of a merely neg-
ligent failure to investigate probably deserves a smaller penalty on
moral grounds than one filed recklessly or with actual knowledge that
suit was meritless.20
On the cost side, litigation over penalties can add significantly to
administrative expense."' Indeed, critics of 1983 Rule 11 were fond
of complaining about the high cost of "satellite litigation" at the sanc-
tions stage.2  But there is a puzzle: If litigation over penalties is
costly, then settlement of the penalty dispute should be an attractive
option.m Since settlement avoids litigation, it also avoids litigation
219 These risk-bearing costs will persist, and perhaps even increase, if the damage
award is adjusted upward to compensate for erroneous penalties, as Professors
Polinsky and Rubinfeld recommend. See Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 60, at 419-
21 (arguing that the damage award can be adjusted upward to offset the reduction in
expected value due to erroneous imposition of penalties on legitimate plaintiffs).
220 For instance, factors relevant to determining the appropriate sanction under
current Rule 11 include "[w]hether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent"
and "whether [the filing] was intended to injure." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory commit-
tee's note (1993). Moreover, under 1983 Rule 11, courts did not often award huge
penalties; they frequently set the penalty amount equal to the opposing party's fees
and costs. See Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Lookingfor a
Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 383, 399 (1990) (stating that
.attorney's fees have . . . dominated the sanctions picture under Rule 11"); see also
Marshall et al., supra note 12, at 956-58 (mentioning an empirical study which found a
median Rule 11 sanction of $2500 and 91.3% of sanctions totalling $25,000 or less).
21 For a useful game-theoretic analysis of the penalty stage that highlights the
tradeoff between administrative costs and deterrence benefits, see Polinsky &
Rubinfeld, supra note 60.
= See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 189, at 1018 (stating that excessive satellite litiga-
tion "results from [Rule 1l's] inherent unpredictability and the readiness of lawyers to
resort to any device available to exert pressure on their opponents"); Carl Tobias, The
1993 Revision of Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 172-73 (1994) (stating that 1983 Rule 11
created expensive and undesirable litigation over the appropriateness of sanctions). It
is also worth noting that pervasive satellite litigation might have been primarily a tran-
sitional problem under 1983 Rule 11-the result of judicial and litigant uncertainty
about the new Rule's application. If so, then administrative costs might not be as high
as many claim. See Tobias, supra, at 174-75 (noting that the quantity of satellite litiga-
tion declined as federal judges became more consistent in applying Rule 11); see also
Marshall et al., supra note 12, at 958 (empirical study reporting relatively little attorney
time spent on Rule 11 matters).
M-Polinsky and Rubinfeld ignore the settlement possibility in their analysis of
Rule 11 sanctions, see Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 60, and I am aware of no other
work that addresses the point. But cf Georgene M. Vairo, Commentay, Rule 11: Where
We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 475, 482 (1991) (suggesting that
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costs. Therefore, if administrative costs are high at the penalty stage,
there must be a serious impediment to settlement.224
One possible impediment is informational asymmetry. If one
party has private information at the penalty stage, even after pretrial
opportunities for fact-gathering, the residual informational asymme-
try could make settlement difficult.5 A potentially more significant
factor, however, is the reputational effect of penalties. Defendants
benefit from official declarations of frivolousness-and so they have
incentives to litigate-insofar as a clear judicial signal of attorney
reputation facilitates formation of a reputation market.2 Moreover,
lawyers for plaintiffs in meritorious suits also have incentives to liti-
gate. A lawyer who is falsely accused of filing a frivolous suit faces a
potentially serious harm to her reputation. She might be inclined
to settle if settlement guaranteed complete secrecy, but secrecy is
hard to achieve. For instance, it would be difficult to conceal the facts
from friends and colleagues in the same firm,2 and there is always a
risk that news of a settlement will spread to the wider legal commu-
nity. Given this, a lawyer might reasonably prefer to take a chance
1983 Rule 11 might have exacerbated the level of contentiousness, which interfered
with settlement of the main action even when attorneys might otherwise have been
inclined to settle to avoid sanctions).
224 An alternative possibility is that judges frequently impose penalties on their
own motion without allowing settlement.
22- See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 200, at 484-87 (discussing the effects of
informational asymmetry on settlement). In the informed-plaintiff model, the defen-
dant always knows the suit is frivolous when the plaintiff drops, so there can be no in-
formational asymmetry. In practice, however, a decision to drop is not likely to com-
municate such a clear message. In the informed-defendant model, the defendant
knows whether the suit is meritless, but she does not necessarily know whether (or
how much) the plaintiff has investigated, and this can create an informational asym-
me .Judges sometimes recount the history of an attorney's litigation conduct when
deciding on a Rule 11 sanction. See, e.g., Blancato v. Saint Mary Hosp., No. CIV.A.91-
4114, 1993 WL 273687, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1993); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advi-
sory committee's note (1993) (noting that one factor relevant to deciding the appro-
priate sanction is "whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other
litigation"). This kind of summary can be an effective vehicle for publicizing attorney
reputation.
Z27 See, e.g., FDIC v. Tekfen Constr. & Installation Co., 847 F.2d 440, 444 (7th Cir.
1988) (noting the importance of stigma); Marshall et al., supra note 12, at 957
(hypothesizing that much of the bar's resistance to Rule 11 may be due to the stigma-
tizing effect of the penalty); Neil H. Klausner, Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing
Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 330
(1986) (noting that stigma alone can be an effective deterrent).
V8 Especially if the defendant can also seek a penalty from the firm on a joint
liability theory. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c) (1) (A).
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with litigation, and eventual vindication, than to settle the penalty
disputeY2e As a result, litigation costs could be high at the penalty
stage.
These benefits and costs balance out a bit differently in the in-
formed-plaintiff and the informed-defendant models. To achieve
substantial deterrence in the informed-plaintiff model, the penalty
must be set so high that it is likely to trigger proportionality problems
and produce high error and administrative costs, especially with the
230strong reputation risk that attaches to a knowingly frivolous filing.
In the informed-defendant model, on the other hand, only a modest
penalty is needed, at least in theory, to deter all frivolous plaintiffs 
2 '
A modest penalty is likely to create less of a chilling effect on merito-
rious plaintiffs and lower reputation obstacles to settlement. At the
same time, however, even a modest penalty can still deter a large
number of meritorious suits, and informational asymmetries as well as
residual reputation risks can still scuttle settlement.
Thus, the choice of a penalty system involves a much more com-
plicated cost-benefit balance than is commonly supposed. Penalties
are more strongly justified in informed-defendant cases, but even
there the possibility of high costs cannot be ignored. Indeed, it might
be best to implement a penalty approach only sparingly, especially if
• .J One observes similar behavior from doctors, who sometimes insist on litigating
medical malpractice suits to avoid harm to reputation and self-esteem. See Gross &
Syverud, supra note 124, at 366 (stating that doctors often go to trial in malpractice
suits for "the opportunity for vindication"); cf. Syverud, supra note 74, at 1159
(discussing the effect of harm to reputation from lawsuits in other vocational con-
texts).
230 See Katz, supra note 17, at 20 (noting the high costs). This outcome is difficult
to demonstrate intuitively, but a numerical example might help. Recall ourJohn and
Mary hypothetical. See supra Part V.A.1. There we assumed an 80% win rate for legiti-
mate plaintiffs, an average verdict of $50,000, a filing cost of $1000, and litigation costs
of $10,000 for each side. Assuming that 50% of potential suits are frivolous, a penalty
set as high as the defendant's total litigation costs ($10,000) still results in 50% of po-
tential frivolous suits being filed (compared to 67% without a penalty) and 72% of le-
gitimate suits being tried.
231 It can be shown with some mathematics that in the informed-defendant model
all frivolous plaintiffs are deterred from suing by a penalty equal to the defendant's
discovery costs. This penalty, in effect, forces all suits out of the mixed and into the
investigation equilibrium by raising the cutoff that separates the two equilibria. By
contrast, it is not possible, even in theory, to deter all frivolous filings in the informed-
plaintiff model. The frequency of frivolous filings declines gradually, but never
reaches zero, as the size of the penalty increases. See Katz, supra note 17, at 19-20
(noting that an infinitely high deposit or penalty would be required in order to deter
absolutely all strike suits).
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private parties can create a penalty system on their own through the
use of a bonding device.f2
3. A More Promising Approach: Judicial Screening
There is another approach that has more promise than strict
pleading or penalties: early judicial screening of frivolous suits based
on a preliminary review of the merits. Currently, courts screen civil
rights cases by granting early summary judgment on qualified immu-
nity, sometimes after permitting narrow discovery focused on the
immunity issue.23' Unfortunately, however, the idea of early screening
has not been widely accepted.
My proposal implements the screening approach, but in a differ-
ent way than in the civil rights cases. The approach has three com-
ponents. First, plaintiff must submit evidence in the form of affida-
232 See supra text accompanying notes 164-72. One could make an exception for
those extreme situations where frivolousness is transparently clear. These include
cases in which the plaintiff's attorney plainly knows the suit is meritless, as well as cases
in which the attorney does little or no investigation despite ready access to public
information. See, e.g., Johnson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 18 F.3d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir.
1994) (referring to the lawsuit as a "gamble" and the attorney's conduct as "reckless
willingness" to impose burdens on others). The administrative and error costs are
likely to be low when frivolousness is easy to verify, and the intentionality or extreme
recklessness of the conduct might support a penalty on moral grounds. At the same
time, however, it is important to confine this category to the most extreme cases and
to define its contours as clearly as possible to minimize costs.
2 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a
plaintiff alleging illicit motive in a civil rights case where defendant has a qualified
immunity defense must offer "specific, nonconclusory assertions of evidence" support-
ing motive in order to avoid early summary judgment prior to discovery); Elliott v.
Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiffs must produce
evidence of illicit motive to avoid early summary judgment in a civil rights case where
motive is an issue and qualified immunity is a defense); Blum, supra note 4, at 92-95
(stating that under Rule 56(f), plaintiffs can move for discovery to acquire information
necessary to defend a summaryjudgment motion, but that "the court could limit such
discovery to matters related to the qualified immunity issue"); Eric H. Cottrell, Note,
Civil Rights Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Supreme
Court Takes a Look at Heightened Pleading Standards in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1085, 1110-11 (1994)
(proposing early summary judgment to screen out frivolous civil rights cases); see also
Lapham, supra note 138, at 281-88 (recommending a similar approach more generally
through a modification of Rule 56(f)). Moreover, some states screen medical mal-
practice cases, but this screening method relies on panel rather than judicial review
and penalties rather than dismissal. SeeJean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screen-
ing Panels: Proposed Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181, 188-
97, 239-51 (1990) (reviewing current medical malpractice screening panels and pro-
posing a model statute).
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vits, documents and the like supporting the allegations of his
complaint. Second, if for some reason plaintiff cannot make the nec-
essary evidentiary submission, he must file an affidavit detailing the
investigatory steps he has taken before filing, the reasons why he has
not investigated further, and the reasons why he believes that proba-
tive evidence might be obtained through discovery. 2 4 Third, before
plaintiff can litigate past the filing stage, the trial judge must deter-
mine whether the suit has merit based on plaintiffs submissions.
This determination is not the same as a summary judgment. The
purpose is to ascertain whether the minimal requirements of Rule 11
are satisfied, not whether a reasonable jury could find for the plain-
tiff.
If the plaintiff does not submit evidence or an explanatory affida-
vit, then defendant can obtain dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Moreover, dismissal is also warranted if the trial judge determines
that the suit is meritless based on either the evidence or the inade-
quacy of the plaintiffs prefiling investigation. If, however, the plain-
tiff persuades the judge of the adequacy of his investigation and his
need for discovery, the judge may either permit the suit to go forward
in the normal course, or review submissions a second time after allow-
ing limited discovery.
This description, although not a precise blueprint, is sufficient to
show the advantages of screening over other devices. For instance,
lying is a much less serious problem for screening than for strict
pleading, because the plaintiff must submit evidence-notjust allega-
25
tions.
Furthermore, satellite litigation is likely to generate lower costs
here than in a penalty system. There might be more cases to review,
but only if defendants challenge submissions more frequently than
they seek penalties. Even so, most of these cases should be quite easy
to review given the limited scope of the decision. In addition, be-
234 In some respects, this resembles the affidavit a party now files under Rule 56(f)
to postpone summary judgment until after discovery, except that the 56(f) affidavit
does not focus on prefiling investigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f); see also Lapham,
supra note 138, at 267-81 (discussing the requirements of Rule 56(f)).
" Of course, screening will not help much if the plaintiff is a blatant liar and is in
a position to have personal knowledge of the material facts. Under these circum-
stances, the plaintiff can avoid being screened out simply by filing her own affidavit
and lying under oath. However, this extreme situation is very difficult to handle under
any approach. Neither a strict pleading nor a penalty system is likely to do any better
than screening:
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cause there is no risk of a stigmatizing penalty and no need to find
bad faith, the trial judge has more power to limit hearing opportu-
nities in order to control costs.2z  Moreover, the salient issues focus
narrowly on the adequacy of plaintiffs submission rather than rang-
ing broadly over the merits of plaintiff's case.2" Finally, parties are
not likely to litigate as strenuously because screening does not have
the same implications for reputation, and the risk of erroneous dis-
missal should be relatively low given the limited nature of the screen-
ing inquiry.m
Conceivably, lawyers will file more frivolous suits when penalties
are not a risk, gambling on the chance of making it through the
screen. But filing is more costly in a screening system, since lawyers
must submit affidavits and verify investigation efforts. With these ad-
ditional costs, filing will not be very attractive when there is only a
slight chance of getting through the screen. Moreover, early judicial
screening undermines a frivolous plaintiffs ability to exploit his in-
formational advantage in the informed-plaintiff model and reduces
the temptation of defendants in meritorious suits to pool in the in-
formed-defendant model, thereby reducing the frequency of frivolous
filings.
One potential risk plagues screening and other devices, such as
penalties, which require judicial determinations of frivolousness. A
trial judge might abuse the discretion these devices confer by differ-
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-49 (1976) (stating a balancing test
for due process notice and hearing requirements); cf Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d
1551, 1558-61 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting the flexibility of hearing requirements under
Rule 11, and reciting factors to consider including the type and severity of the sanc-
tion and the necessity of a bad faith finding, and concluding that a hearing is normally
not required); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Servs., Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 205-06 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that it was proper to impose Rule 11 sanctions without a hearing where
no bad faith was involved and where the judge could easily determine the quality of
investigation).
237 Making the frivolousness determination at a very early stage in the lawsuit
should help focus judicial attention on the correct inquiry-what plaintiff's lawyer
knew and did prior to filing-and should guard against the temptation to consider the
results of later discovery and trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note
(1983) ("The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight"); Nelken,
supra note 220, at 401-04 (advocating a focus on prefiling conduct); Schwarzer, supra
note 189, at 1021-22 (same).
23S This is especially so if significant doubts are resolved in plaintiffs favor. Cf
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ill. Corp., 113 F.R.D. 637, 639 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (noting that "'all doubts [should] be resolved in favor of the signer'" before im-
posing Rule 11 sanctions (quoting Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d
243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985))).
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entially burdening particular types of litigation, such as civil rights
suits, disfavored on substantive grounds.239 Such abuse could be par-
ticularly troubling in a screening system because screening gives the
judge power to stop the suit before it gets underway.
Although this concern is relevant, it does not justify ruling out a
screening approach altogether. For one thing, clearer articulation of
the standard prohibiting frivolous suits, as part of a tighter Rule 11,
should reduce the opportunities for abuse. Clearer standards also
make a more searching appellate review possible, which can constrain
trial judges. If hard evidence of frequent abuse exists (and I know of
none), then the Advisory Committee might consider including an
express caution in the Note accompanying the Rule. In the end, if
the risk of abuse is substantial and incurable-in which case we have
much more to worry about than frivolous suits-it might be better to
rely on approaches that give the trial judge less power up front.
CONCLUSION
Frivolous litigation is a complex phenomenon. It is difficult to
define and almost impossible to observe, and it defies all attempts at
simple explanation. Indeed, we have no hard empirical evidence
bearing on the nature or seriousness of the problem. Yet we continue
to regulate.
This Article has shown how game theory might help fill some of
the informational gaps. Frivolous litigation is complex because it
arises from a complicated interplay of strategic forces. When game-
theoretic tools are applied to the problem, they yield a crucial insight:
informational asymmetry is likely to be the most significant cause of
frivolous suits.
Building on this insight, we have seen the importance of another
factor: the direction of the informational asymmetry. When plaintiff
has the private information, he can pretend to be legitimate and fool
an uninformed defendant. When defendant has the private informa-
tion, however, the analysis is more complicated: a meritless suit is
frivolous only if plaintiff should have investigated, and the game-
theoretic analysis helps identify cases that satisfy this condition.
Whether the plaintiff or the defendant has the private informa-
239 See, e.g., Robert L. Carter, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil
Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2179, 2191-95 (1989) (criticizing 1983 Rule 11 on this
ground).
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tion, frivolous suits waste litigation costs and induce unjustified wealth
transfers. The precise nature and extent of these problems differ
according to the direction of the informational asymmetry, but one
critically important prediction applies across the board. One of the
most serious effects of frivolous litigation is indirect: frivolous suits
frustrate settlement of legitimate suits.
We have also seen how a game-theoretic analysis can assist poli-
cymaking. The challenge here is to translate the formal results into
relatively simple, yet reliable, generalizations suitable for regulatory
use, and to do this in a way that is sensitive to the limits of formal
analysis. In particular, we derived a workable definition of a reason-
able prefiling investigation that clarified the vague mandate in
current Rule 11. Moreover, we saw how it is possible to use formal
analysis coupled with empirical research to identify particular settings
likely to have serious frivolous suit problems justifying enforcement
measures. And we also saw how formal results can help in designing
an optimal enforcement scheme.
More work is needed, of course. There are other possible infor-
mation structures to explore.24 ° We also need to examine lawsuits
with more complex party structures. Nevertheless, the informed-
plaintiff and informed-defendant models provide a framework for
understanding the basic dynamics driving frivolous suits and a foun-
dation for future work.
From the outset, this Article has had a broader goal: to show that
game-theoretic reasoning is a useful and vital tool for procedural
analysis. Regulation requires prediction, and prediction in the litiga-
tion setting requires an understanding of strategic interaction. Game
theory offers deep insight into strategic thinking, and much of this
insight can be understood without mathematical sophistication. It is
vital that we continue the effort to infuse procedural rulemaking with
game-theoretic analysis, tempered by empirical research and widely
shared experience. The future of our procedural system may depend
on it.
_0 For example, it is possible for both parties to be ignorant of the merits at the
time of filing. See, e.g., Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (6th Cir. 1986)
(imposing Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiff's attorney for failure to investigate adequately
whether the defendant manufacturer sold the tetracycline that the plaintiff used). It is
also possible that even more complex scenarios might be needed to explain some
cases. For example, the defendant might know the suit is meritless and also know that
the plaintiff knows the suit is meritless, but not know whether the plaintiff knows that
the defendant knows.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, I summarize the results of the informed-plain-
tiff and informed-defendant models in mathematical form. I rely on
Professor Avery Katz's work for proofs of the informed-plaintiff re-
sults,24' and I prove the informed-defendant results in a separate
technical paper.2 42
I. FORMAL NOTATION COMMON TO BOTH MODELS
r - The background proportion of potential legitimate
(meritorious) suits. 1 - r, therefore, is the background
proportion of frivolous (meritless) suits.
p - The probability that a legitimate (meritorious) suit
wins on liability at trial.
x - The expected trial award if a legitimate (meritorious)
case wins.
cF, c0 , c, - Plaintiff's costs of filing suit, litigating from the filing
stage through discovery, and litigating from the dis-
covery stage through trial, respectively.
c - Plaintiffs total litigation costs;
i.e., c = cF + cD + cr.
d0, dT - Defendant's costs of litigating the case through discov-
ery, and from the discovery stage through trial, respec-
tively.
d - Defendant's total litigation costs;
i.e., d = d o + dC.
II. THE INFORMED-PLAINTIFF MODEL
Assuming px - c > 0, so all legitimate plaintiffs sue, the following
results obtain in equilibrium:
A. If r > (px - c,, - c,)/(px + d):
0 All defendants offer px - cD - cr.
241 See Katz, supra note 17.
242 See Bone, supra note 122.
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* All frivolous plaintiffs sue.
* All plaintiffs accept the settlement offer.
B. If r < (px- c,, -c)/(px + d):
* Defendants offer px - c, - cr with probability a and refuse to
settle with probability 1 - a, where:
(T = c/(Px- C- C).
* Frivolous plaintiffs sue with probability 5, where:
8= [r(cD+ c, + d)]/[(1 - r) (px- c -c)].
* All plaintiffs accept an offer of px - c, - c.
* If the defendant refuses to settle, legitimate plaintiffs still liti-
gate, but frivolous plaintiffs drop.
III. THE INFORMED-DEFENDANT MODEL
Assuming px - c > 0 and letting b denote the cost of a prefiling in-
243vestigation, the following results hold in equilibrium:
A. If r < c/(px - c- c):
1. And b < r(px - c): The same Investigation Equilibrium as in D.1
below.
2. And b > r(px - c): Plaintiffs never investigate and never sue.
B. If c/(px- c, -cT) < r < (c, + c)/(px- cT):
1. And b < (1 - r)ci The same Investigation Equilibrium as in D.1
below.
2. And b > r(px - c): Plaintiffs never investigate and never sue.
3. And (1 - r)c, < b < r (px - c): The same Mixed Equilibrium as in
D.3 below.
243 A technical point deserves brief mention here. The reader versed in game
theory will note that some of the equilibria described in this section can exist only for
particular beliefs off the equilibrium path. See generally RASMUSEN, supra note 18, at
142-52 (discussing the importance of out-of-equilibrium beliefs). In my technical
paper, I specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs in a plausible way, using passive conjectures
and a simple version of the intuitive criterion. See Bone, supra note 122, at 15-18, nn.
21-23 (noting the possible effects of strategies and beliefs that are off the equilibrium
path).
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C. If (c, + c)/(px - cT) < r < (c. + d)/(px - CT):
1. And b < (1 - r)ci The same Investigation Equilibrium as in D.1
below.
2. And b > (1 - r)(c, + q):
* Plaintiffs never investigate and always sue.
" Defendants always offer r(px - cT) - c, whether the suit is
meritorious or meritless.
" Plaintiffs always accept.
3. And (1 - r)cF < b < (1 - r)(cF + c): The same Mixed Equilibrium
as in D.3 below.
D. If r > (c + d)/(px - C): (These are the three equilibria discussed in
Part IV.B of the text)
1. And b < (1 - r)c---Investigation Equilibrium
a. Equilibrium:
" Plaintiffs always investigate.
" No meritless suits are filed.
" Defendants always offer px - c. - cr in meritorious
suits.
* Meritorious plaintiffs always accept.
b. Results:
Private litigation costs (LC) are:
LC = b + rcF.
Plaintiff's ex ante expected value of suit (EV) is:
EV = r(px - c) - b.
Defendant's ex ante expected loss (EL) is:
EL = r(px - cD - ct).
2. And b > (1 - r)(cF + c)--Filing Equilib7ium
a. Equilibrium:
• Plaintiffs never investigate and always sue.
" In meritorious suits, defendants offer px - q) - c, with
probability t, and refuse to settle with probability 1 - T,
where:
-r = [r(px - c-) - c]/r(px - c - c).
" Defendants always refuse to settle meritless suits.
* Plaintiffs always accept an offer of px -c0 - c,
" Plaintiffs drop with probability B in response to a re-
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fusal to settle and litigate with probability 1 - B, where:
B = (c + c, + d)/(px + d).
b. Results:
LC = cF + (1 - r)cD+ (1 -r)dD(px - cD -cr)/(px + d).
EV = r(px - c) - (1 - r) (cF + c,).
EL = r(px-C - cr) + (1 - r)d(px-cD -cr)/(px + d).
3. And (1 - r)cF < b < (1 - r)(c+ c0)--Mixed Equilibrium
a. Equilibrium:
* Plaintiffs investigate before filing with probability 0
and do not investigate with probability 1 - 0, where:
0 = (px- CD- c)/(px + d).
" Plaintiffs who investigate sue if and only if their suits
are meritorious. Plaintiffs who do not investigate al-
ways sue.
* In meritorious suits, defendants offer px - q, - c, with
probability t, and refuse to settle with probability I -",
where:
"t = [r(px -C -c) + (1 - r)cF - b]/r(px -C -c).
• Defendants always refuse to settle meritless suits.
" Plaintiffs always accept an offer of px - cD - c, and al-
ways drop when they have not investigated and defen-
dant refuses to settle.
b. Results:
LC = b + rcF
EV = r(px - c) - b.
EL = r(px -C -c).
IV. CALCULATIONS FOR EXAMPLES
A. The John v. Mary Hypothetical
In the text, I use a slip-and-fall hypothetical involving John and
Mary to illustrate the intuition behind the informed-plaintiff model.
The critical variables have the following values in the hypothetical:
p = 0.8, x = 50,000, c, = 1000, and cD + cr= dD+ dT = 10,000.
From Part II of this Appendix, we know that the critical value of r
separating the two equilibria in the informed-plaintiff model is:
r = (px - CD - Cr)/(px + d). Substituting the numerical values for the
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variables in this expression, we get:
r= (0.8 x 50,000 - 10,000)/(0.8 x50,000 + 10,000) = 0.6.
It follows that when r > 0.6--or equivalently, when the fraction of
potential frivolous suits is less than 40%-all frivolous plaintiffs sue in
equilibrium; all defendants offer px - cD - cr, and all plaintiffs accept
the offer. Similarly, when r < 0.6-or equivalently, when the fraction
of potential frivolous suits is greater than 40%-some frivolous plain-
tiffs sue in equilibrium, and defendants offer px - cD - cr only some of
the time.
In footnote 94 of the text, we assumed that r = 0.5, so the second
equilibrium holds. Part II.B of this Appendix gives expressions for a
(the frequency of px - c, - c, offers) and 5 (the frequency of frivolous
filings) in this equilibrium. Substituting the numerical values for the
corresponding variables in these expressions, we get:
0= 1000/(0.8 x 50,000- 10,000) = 1/30
5 = [0.5 x 20,000]/[0.5 x (0.8 x 50,000 - 10,000)] = 2/3.
Therefore, frivolous plaintiffs sue 2/3, or about 67%, of the time,
and defendants offer $30,000 in 1/30, or about 3%, of the cases. It
follows that legitimate plaintiffs settle about 3% of the time and go to
trial about 97% of the time-as footnote 94 states.
B. The Paul v. Susan Hypothetical
In the text, I use a medical malpractice hypothetical involving
Paul and Susan to illustrate the intuition behind the informed-defen-
dant model. The values of the critical variables in this hypothetical
are: r = 0.5, p = 0.8, x = 50,000, cF = 1000, and cD = c, = dD = d, = 5,000.
The condition for the three equilibria described in Part III.D of
this Appendix is: r > (CD + dD)/(px - C). Substituting the numerical
values, the righthand side of this inequality is:
(5000 + 5000)/(0.8 x 50,000- 5000) = 2/7.
With r = 0.5, the condition is satisfied.
1. Scenario #1: b = 100
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An investigation costs $100 in Scenario #1, so b = 100. Substi-
tuting the numerical values, we have:
(1 - r)CF= 0.5 x 1000 = 500.
Therefore, b < (1 - r)cF, and the investigation equilibrium holds.
2. Scenario #2: b = 5000
In Scenario #2, an investigation costs $5000, so b = 5000. Since
(1 - r) (cF + c,) = 0.5 x (1000 + 5000) = 3000, the condition for the
filing equilibrium holds: b > (1 - r)(cF + c). Part III.D.2 of this
Appendix gives expressions for " (the rate of px - c" - c, offers in meri-
torious suits) and B (the frequency with which plaintiffs drop when
defendants refuse to settle). Substituting the numerical values for the
corresponding variables in these expressions, we get:
r = [0.5 x (0.8 x 50,000- 5000) -5000]/0.5 x (0.8 x 50,000- 10,000)
= 5/6
B = 20,000/ (0.8 x 50,000 + 10,000) = 2/5.
Therefore, defendants offer $30,000 in 5/6, or about 83%, of the
meritorious cases, and plaintiffs drop 2/5, or 40%, of the time when
defendants refuse to settle. As a result, meritorious plaintiffs drop
1/6 X 2/5 = 1/15, or about 7%, of their suits. Moreover, plaintiffs
litigate 3/5 of the meritless suits all the way through discovery.
3. Scenario #3: b = 2000
An investigation costs $2000 in Scenario #3, so b = 2000. This
value of b falls within the range that supports a mixed equilibrium
(i.e., 500 < 2000 < 3000). Part III.D.3 of this Appendix gives expres-
sions for 0 (the rate of prefiling investigation) and " (the rate of px -
c, - cr offers in meritorious suits). Substituting the numerical values
for the corresponding variables in these expressions, we get:
Q = (0.8 x 50,000 - 10,000)/(0.8 x 50,000 + 10,000) = 3/5
"r = [0.5 x (0.8 x 50,000- 10,000) + 0.5 x 1000- 2000]/[0.5(0.8 x
50,000 - 10,000)] = 9/10.
Therefore, plaintiffs investigate 3/5, or 60%, of the time, and de-
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fendants offer $30,000 in 9/10, or 90%, of the meritorious cases and
refuse to settle 10% of those cases. Because the plaintiff files a merit-
less suit whenever he is uninformed, it follows that 40% of all merit-
less suits are filed. Moreover, when defendants refuse to settle, those
plaintiffs who have investigated go to trial and those who have not
drop their suits. Therefore, 6% of all meritorious cases go to trial
(i.e., a 10% settlement refusal rate multiplied by a 60% investigation
rate), and 4% are dropped.
4. Modified Hypothetical
a. Footnote 115
In footnote 115, I change the numerical values to show how
serious a problem the mixed equilibrium can create. In the modified
hypothetical, r = 0.4, p = 0.6, x = 200,000, c, = 1000, c = 19,000,
cr = 20,000, and dD =dT = 20,000. Moreover, a prefiling investigation
costs $11,000; thus, b = 11,000.
With these new values, the condition for the Part III.D equilibria
still holds: (cD + d)/(px - c,) = (19,000 + 20,000)/(0.6 x 200,000
-20,000) = 0.39, and with r = 0.5, r > (cD + dD)/(px - CI), as the
condition requires. Furthermore, with b = 11,000, the condition for a
mixed equilibrium also holds. The new numerical values yield
(1 - r)cF = 600 and (1 - r) (c, + CD) = 12,000; therefore, b = 11,000 falls
between these two extremes, as the mixed equilibrium requires.
Substituting the new numerical values for the corresponding vari-
ables in the expressions for 0 and , we get:
0 = (0.6 x 200,000 - 39,000)/(0.6 x 200,000 + 40,000) = 81/160
= [0.4 x (0.6 x 200,000 - 39,000) + 0.6 x 1000 - 11,000]/[0.4(0.6 x
200,000 - 39,000)] = 55/81.
Therefore, plaintiffs investigate only 81/160, or only about 50%,
of the time. Moreover, defendants offer $81,000 in only 55/81, or
about 68%, of the meritorious cases and thus refuse to settle 32% of
such cases. As a result, 50% of all meritless suits are filed; 16% of all
meritorious cases go to trial (i.e., a 32% settlement refusal rate multi-
plied y a 50% investigation rate), and 16% are dropped. Thus, 32%
of all meritorious cases have problematic outcomes (either going to




In footnote 135, I consider what happens in a mixed equilibrium
when the expected trial award (px) is increased from $40,000, as in
the original hypothetical (i.e., 0.8 x 50,000), to $90,000-when all the
other variables are held constant.
It is easy to verify that the conditions for the mixed equilibrium
still hold when px = 90,000. First, (c, + d,)/(px - c,) = 10,000/ (90,000
- 5000) = 2/17, and with r = 0.5, it is clear that r > (q, + d)/(px - C').
Second, the increase in px has no effect on the range for b, so with
b = 2000, the cost of investigation still falls between the two extremes
of $500 and $3000.
With px = 90,000, the values of 0 and "r become:
0 = (90,000 - 10,000)/(90,000 + 10,000) = 4/5
c = [0.5 x (90,000 - 10,000) + 0.5 x 1000 - 2000]/[0.5(90,000 -
10,000)] = 77/80.
Therefore, while plaintiffs investigate 60% of the time when the ex-
pected trial award is $40,000, they investigate 4/5, or 80%, of the time
when the expected trial award is $90,000. Furthermore, the rate at
which plaintiffs drop meritorious suits-which is also the frequency of
unjustified wealth transfers-is 1/5 x 3/80 = 3/400, or about 0.8%,
when the expected trial award is $90,000. This should be compared
to 4% when the expected trial award is $40,000.
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